HARCHAND SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Harchand Singh and Surinder Singh appellants have by way of this appeal challenged the order of the Sessions Judge, Ropar, dated 18th August, 1983, convicting and sentencing them to three years, rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500 each, in default further two months imprisonment each, under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act.

(2.) On the intervening night of 18th and 19th November, 1982, at about 3 a.m. Piara Singh Head Constable PW 2, Karam Chand Sub-Inspector of Food and Supplies Department PW 1 with the help of other police official had arranged a nakabandi at Sohana barrier when truck No. PBW 356 came from the side of village Landhran. A signal with a torch was given to the driver to stop the truck but the driver did not obey the signal. The truck was being driven by Harchand Singh appellant and Surinder Singh appellant was sitting by his side. The nakabandi party chased the truck in Government jeep and the truck was consequently made to stop about 2-1/2 km from where the Union Territory of Chandigarh starts. The truck was proceeding towards the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It was carrying 70 bags of paddy and some loose paddy. The whole of the paddy weighed 125 quintals. Neither of the appellants was in a position to show any permit to the nakabandi party. The truck was taken into possession vide memo Exhibit PA. Both the appellants were arrested and formal first information report Exhibit PB/1 was registered at Police Station, Mubarikpur. Since vide notification No GSR 92/CA/55. 5-3/81, dated 22nd October, 1981, paddy was declared as an essential commodity and the movement of the same outside Punjab from the State of Punjab was an offence, the appellants were challaned and convicted as stated above.

(3.) Admittedly, the truck was apprehended at a short distance from the boundary of the Union Territory, Chandigarh. The question which therefore, calls for determination is as to whether the presence of the truck at a short distance from the Union Territory, Chandigarh, would amount to an attempt to commit an offence. There is a thin line between preparation for an offence and an attempt to commit an offence. It has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the act would amount to a mere preparation to commit an offence or would be termed as an attempt to commit an offence. The appellants would have changed their mind at any place short of the boundary of the Union Territory, Chandigarh. So, in this situation, it cannot be said that it was an attempt to commit an offence. Mr. S.K. Pipat, learned counsel for the appellants, has placed reliance on a Single Bench authority of this Court Mohinder Singh and another v. State of Haryana, 1983 1 CurLR 76, wherein in a similar situation it was held that the act of the accused did not amount to an attempt since an option was with them to change their mind before the offence was committed. Apart from this, defence taken up by the appellants was that they wanted to go to Kharar. That being part of the Punjab State, I think that the defence itself is plausible and there is nothing to suggest that the defence plea was incorrect. Consequently, I am of the view that the case against the appellants does not stand proved beyond reasonable doubt. I give the appellants the benefit of doubt and acquit them of the charge against them. The fine, if paid, would be returned to the appellants. Order accordingly.