GIAN SINGH Vs. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, THANESAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Municipality, Thanesar, through its Administrator, on February 28, 1983 has filed a complaint before the Executive Magistrate, Kurukshetra requiring initiation of proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and styled itself as the first party, the second party (the petitioner herein arrayed) therein was said to be the source of likelihood of breach of peace with regard to the possession over a piece of cultivated land. The learned Magistrate on February 28, 1983, passed a composite preliminary order under Sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby he recorded satisfaction that there is imminent apprehension of breach of peace over the land and the circumstances were of emergent nature, requiring him to appoint a Receiver to take possession of the land. The petitioner herein as the aggrieved party, on the basis that he was a lessee of the land in dispute and in possession thereof, moved an application for dropping the proceedings and raised a number of pleas. The learned Magistrate noted most of them, but passed an order on April 20, 1983 in a most cryptic fashion. His words are : -

(2.) THE petitioner aggrieved against both the aforesaid orders approached the Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra in revision. After considering the respective contention of the parties he dismissed the same, which gave cause to the petitioner to move this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(3.) AFTER hearing learned counsel for the parties and pursuing the documents placed on the record, it appears to me that there is a dispute between the parties pertaining to the land involved. Whereas the petitioner claims to be in possession thereof as a lessee from the inhabitants of Thanesar, the land being described in the revenue -papers as 'Shamlat' and his possession preserved by status -quo order obtained from the Civil Court; the Municipality, Thanesar claims that the property had once vested in it under the Haryana Municipal Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1974 and despite the striking down of the said Act, the Municipality continues to be in possession of the land in dispute. It is further maintained by the Municipality that under the provisions of the Haryana Municipal Act, it otherwise had the control over the property which was in common use of the inhabitants whatever be the respective contention of the parties with regard to their civil rights over the land, proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could only be initiated if such a dispute concerning land was likely to cause breach of peace. It is precisely for that purpose that a preliminary order recording the satisfaction of the Executive Magistrate is required to be passed under Section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though it is true that the order dated February 28, 1983 ostensibly is within the framework of the aforesaid provision of law yet there chances were of the language employed therein being mechanical and lifeless, until and unless the application of the petitioner to drop the proceedings was disposed of by a reasoned order. It is plain from the afore -extracted operative part of the order dated April 20, 1983, that the learned Magistrate did not meet the arguments of the petitioner and summarily dismissed it without disclosing as to what had weighed in his mind. The mere existence of a dispute between the parties does not confer any jurisdiction. It is the dispute of the kind referred to under Section 145 (1) which does. And for that purpose, when the proceedings had been objected to, he was required to give a reasoned order for the continuance of the proceedings. Sequally then the proceedings which were ordered to continue vide order dated April 20, 1983, were nothing but abuse of the process of the Court. Thus this petition is partially allowed to the extent that the order dated April 20, 1983 is quashed requiring the Executive Magistrate to pass a fresh reasoned order disclosing prima facie as to why the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the attachment under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should continue; more so in the light that the Municipality Thanesar by itself is an inanimate person and could not by it self be in breach of peace or be subjected to it.