PUNJAB WAKF BOARD Vs. TARA CHAND AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is defendant's second appeal against whom the suit for possession has been decreed by both the Courts below.

(2.) Tara Chand and others, plaintiffs-respondents, filed the suit for possession of the land measuring 27 kanals 4 marlas on the allegations that they were the owners thereof. Its occupation by one Mauley Shah was merely permissive. On its vacation by him, it reverted and came into actual possession of its owners. The revenue authorities wrongly changed the entry in the column of cultivation of the jamabandi showing the Central Government to be in its possession whereas it had nothing to do with it. It was further stated that Amar Dass, defendant No. 3, had recently gone in possession of the suit land claiming himself to be a lessee under the Punjab Wakf Board (hereinafter called the Board), defendant No. 2. The suit land was not a Muslim Wakf property and did not vest in the Board. Notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code was given to the Secretary, Ministry of Rehabilitation, New Delhi, and to the Board also. Thus, the Union of India was also made a defendant in the suit. The Union of India was proceeded ex parte as no one appeared on its behalf in spite of service. The suit was mainly contested on behalf of the Board and Amar Dass, defendant, the alleged tenant under it. The learned trial Court found that the plaintiffs had succeeded in establishing their ownership of the suit land. The trial Court framed a specific issue to the effect whether the property, in suit, was Wakf property and vested in the Board. Thereunder it found that the suit property could not be declared to be the Wakf property even by user. In view of this finding, the plaintiff suit was decreed. Dissatisfied with the same both the defendants, that is, the Board and Amar Dass, filed two separate appeals. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge with enhanced appellate powers affirmed the said findings of the trial Court and, thus, maintained the decree of the trial Court passed in favour of the plaintiffs. However, in the appeal filed on behalf of the Board, it was observed that the same was incompetent as no resolution was passed authorising the Secretary to the Board to file the appeal. Dissatisfied with the same, the Board has filed this second appeal in this Court.

(3.) At the time of the motion hearing, it was stated that vide Resolution No. 30 dated March 27, 1968, there was a general delegation by the Board in favour of its Secretary and, therefore, he was competent to file the appeal before the District Judge. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the said resolution, the appeal be accepted and the case be remanded to the lower appellate Court for decision on merits.