SHRI JANG BAHADUR Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE accused -petitioner has sought to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Moga dated February 11, 1981, whereby the petitioner and Ravi Uppal were summoned to face trial along with the vender Surinder Kumar Chopra under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short, the Act).

(2.) WITHOUT going into the details of the grounds taken up in the petition, in substance the allegations therein amount to this: That on December 6,1980, food Inspector visited the premises of Surinder Pal Chopra at Moga, who was then having in his possession about 50 Kgs. of Haldi Power 'Agmark' for sale, contained in sealed in sealed packets of various sizes. The Food Inspector purchased 600 grams of Haldi powder 'Agmark, in sealed packets of 200 grams each for analysis for Rs. 4.80 P. against a receipt. The sample of Haldi sent to the public Analyst was subsequently found to be adulterated because it contained ash insoluble in dilute hydrochloric acid 1.60% against the maximum prescribed standard of 1.50% and also 0.70% of grit. The Food Inspector launched the prosecution against Surinder Pal Chopra and also against Jang Bahadur petitioner and Ravi Uppal, who allegedly manufactured Haldi power in sealed packets. The trial Magistrate after going through the record summon the petitioner and Ravi Uppal along with Surinder Pal Chopra accused. Jang Bahadur has challenged the summoning order in this petition.

(3.) THE Only question raised before me by Mr. A.C. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that an order under Section 20 -A of the Act can be passed only on the basis of the evidence recorded during the course of the trial and could not be passed upon material whcih had not been proved as required under law and to buttress his contention, he has cited a decision of this Court in M/S. Garg Masala Company v. State of Punjab, 1981(2) C.L.R. 709. The argument raised appears to be misconceived. I find that this precise question has been answered by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dass Jadgish Chander V. Delhi Administration, AIR 1975 S.C. 1300, wherein it has been observed as follows: - "It is not a correct line of reasoning that in every case under the Act, there has to be initially a prosecution of a particular seller only, but those who may have passed on or sold the adulterated article of food to the vendor, who is being prosecuted, could only be brought in subsequently after a warranty set up under Section 19 (2) has been pleaded and soon to be substantiated. The special provisions in Sections 20 -A, 19(2) and 20 do not take away or derogate from the effect of the ordinary provisions of Sections 233 to 239 of the Old Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, there seems no logically sound reason why, if a distributor or a manufacturer can be subsequently impleaded, under Section 20A he cannot be joined as a co -accused initially in a joint trial if the allegations made justify such a course."