TARA SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners impugn the award of the Divisional Canal Officer and also that the Appellate Authority (Collector, Sangrur), Annexures P.1 and P.2 respectively to the petition, determining the market value of their land acquired under section 30-D(4) of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 (for short, the Act) for the implementation of a scheme. The short submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that though the above noted provision of law makes it incumbent on the authorities concerned to determine the compensation in the light of the principles set out in section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and they, as a matter of fact, had produced evidence in the form of a sale instance and a copy of an earlier award given by the Land Acquisition Court for similar lands, yet these authorities have completely ignored that evidence and have thus said a good-bye to the principles governing the question of determination of market value of the acquired land. As per the pleadings, it is not disputed by the respondent authorities that the petitioners did produce evidence in support of their claim that the market value of their acquired land (measuring 14-1/2 marlas) was not in any way less than Rs.64,000/- per acre. Yet the authorities have not even made a remote reference to that evidence what to talk of disclosing any reasons for not accepting that evidence. All that has been said in the impugned orders is that the Collector of the District had communicated certain rates on the basis of which the rate of compensation payable to the appellants has been determined. The said communication can obviously not be treated as evidence in the matter of determining the amount of compensation payable in the light of sections 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. The authorities have to go by the evidence placed before them by the respective parties. Under section 30-D(4) of the Act, the Divisional Canal Officer has primarily to play the role of a Land Acquisition Court as the mandate of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act primarily concerns the Land Acquisition Court. No doubt it is true that in view of the provisions of section 15 of the latter mentioned Act the Land Acquisition Collector too is guided by the provisions or principles contained in sections 23 and 24 of the Act, but the scope of the two enquiries - only held by the Collector and the other by the Land Acquisition Court for the determination of the market value of the acquired land, is widely different. While the enquiry to be held by the Collector is primarily administrative, the one to be held by the Land Acquisition Court is purely judicial. The Collector can act on materials known to him even otherwise than the evidence such as information furnished by any concerned party, person, personal inspection or reports of the subordinate or different officers, etc. The Court proceedings are strictly governed by the rules of procedure and the Evidence Act. In a nutshell, the scope of enquiry held by a Collector is wider than the ambit of Court proceedings. The very fact that the order of the Divisional Canal Officer is subject to a right of appeal (section 30-D(5) also indicates that the Divisional Canal Officer while determining the quantum of compensation payable for the acquired land has virtually to act as a Land Acquisition Court. In case the Divisional Canal Officer is not required to go into the evidence led by a party in support of its claim to compensation, then what for his order is to be subjected to the right of appeal as the appellate Court would not be in a position to make out the basis or the process of reasoning adopted by the Divisional Canal Officer for fixing the quantum of compensation. It is thus clear that the proceedings before the Divisional Canal Officer and Collector are in the nature of judicial proceedings and their orders have to meet the tests which are laid down for legal or lawful orders. The Divisional Canal Officer just cannot act arbitrarily. In the instant case, as already indicated, neither the Divisional Canal Officer nor the appellate authority has cared to discuss the evidence of the petitioners and thus their impugned orders can hardly be styled as judicial or even quasi-judicial.

(2.) For the reasons recorded above, while setting aside the impugned orders, Annexures P.1 and P.2, I send the case back to the Divisional Canal Officer to redetermine the market value of the acquired land of the petitioners. The petitioners are also held entitled to the costs of this litigation which I determine at Rs. 500/-.