GIAN CHAND Vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, LUDHIANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner Gian Chand was married to Smt. Sudha respondent No 2 on May 9, 1982 The latter filed an application April 30, 1984 before the District Magistrate, Ludhiana (respondent No. 1), under section 8 -A of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act') seeking permission to prosecute the petitioner under section 6 of the Act. She alleged that the petitioner had been given dowry on May 8, 1982 consisting of a scooter, fridge T.V set, washing machine, ornaments furniture and air cooler on the specific condition that he will keep these things in trust for respondent No. 2 till the marriage is performed and thereafter he would transfer these articles to her. It was contended that no such transfer was made by the petitioner as agreed upon and on the other hand he turned her out of his house.

(2.) THE petitioner has filed this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings before the District Magistrate, Ludhiana, respondent No. 1. The only ground urged before me is that for lapse of time no such prosecution, can be instituted by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner. In these respect my attention was -drawn to section 7 of the Act as applicable to the State of Punjab. Sub -Section (2) of this section lays down as follows : -

(3.) MANIFESTLY , this provision is not applicable to complaint under section 6 of the Act. It is evident that section 7 of the Act does not create any bar of limitation in respect of the offence covered by the Section 6. One year's limitation has been provided only for taking cognizance of an offence punishable under 3, 4 and 4 B of the Act. In such a situation the learned petitioner's counsel was unable to support the instant petition under section 482 of the Code. It is quite clear that there is no ground to quash the proceedings before the District Magistrate, Ludhiana, respondent No. 1 for grant of sanction to respondent No 2 for prosecuting the petitioner under section 6 of the Act. This petition, therefore, stands dismissed.