GURANDITTA RAM Vs. MURARI LAL AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an alleged sub -tenant's petition under Sub -section (5) of Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (3 of 1949) (hereinafter called the Act) for revision of the order of Shri M.L. Singla, Rent Controller, Fazilka, dated March 24, 1973, permitting the landlord -Respondent to produce evidence, "in rubuttal" after the, conclusion of the evidence of the tenant and the sub -tenant in spite of the fact that the burden of proof of all the issues framed in the application for ejectment is on the landlord -Respondent and the onus probandi of no issue is on either the tenant or the subtenant.

(2.) MR . Nand Lal Dhingra, learned Counsel for the landlord, has raised two preliminary objections to the maintainability of this petition. His first objection is that the jurisdiction of this Court under Sub -section (5) of Section 15 of the Act is confined to interference with the final orders passed under the Act, and it is not permissible to this Court to test or rectify the propriety or legality of an interlocutory order passed by a Rent Controller in the course of the proceedings under the Act. In support of this objection counsel has relied on an unreported judgment of I.D. Dua, J., in Ruldu Ram and three Ors. v. Shri Sarup Chand C.R. No. 528 of 1963 decided on 13th January, 1964. Ruldu Ram and three others had filed that petition against the order of the Agnate Authority regrinding the case to the Rent Controller for diffident a particular issue. The objection raised in this Court to the maintainability of that revision petition was that the appeal of the other side had not yet been finally disposed of, that a revision petition under Section 15(5) would be competent against the final appellate order, that in the course of the hearing of such a revision petition fee order of remand could also be challenged if the Petitioners (in that case) so wanted and that the High Court should not interfere with the order passed by the appellate authority in the course of the hearing of the appeal. While dealing with that objection, Dua, J., held that Section 15(5) though widely worded and though (Creating no bar to revisions against interlocutory orders, should normally be confined to final orders. The learned Judge did not, in my opinion, even impliedly hold that petitions for revision Under Section 15(5) of the Act against interlocutory orders are either not authorised by that provision or the same were barred by any law. On the other hand the learned Judge made it clear that Section 15(5) does not create any bar to the maintainability of petitions for revision against interlocutory orders. It was only by way of caution that it was observed that normally such revision petitions should be filed against only final orders. The learned Judge did not refuse to hear fee petition because of want of jurisdiction in this Court to do so, but held feat since the exercise of revisional power was discretionary in this Court, fee Judge was disinclined to express any opinion on fee impugned order at feat stage leaving it open to fee aggrieved party to urge fee same matter if it became necessary for him to come to this Court against the final order in which all fee interlocutory orders would be open to revision and consideration. Dua, J.'s judgment in the case of Ruldu Ram and others (supra) is, therefore, no authority for fee proposition that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15(5), of the Act is confined to final orders passed under fee Act and does not extend to non -appealable interlocutory orders passed by fee Rent Controller or by the Appellate Authority. Mr. Dhingra has also referred to the penultimate paragraph of my judgment in Chaman Lal Narang v. Ashwani Kumar and Ors. C.R. No. 683 of 1973 decided on 16th January, 1974, wherein I have referred to the observations of Dua, J., in the case of Ruldu Ram and Ors. I do not think that my observations in that judgment can in any manner advance or support the Respondent's objection. I also attach some significance to the expression "proceedings taken" used in Sub -section (5) of Section 15 in addition to the earlier alternative of "order passed". The fact that a petition for revision has been provided not only .against "any order passed", but also against "any proceeding taken" shows that the scope of the provision is certainly not confined to a final order. There is, therefore, no merit in the first preliminary objection of Mr. Dhingra and I have no hesitation at all in repelling the same. At the same time I must observe that howsoever wide the power of the High Court under Sub -section (5) of Section 15 may be, it is all the same necessary that it should be exercised sparingly and only in a fit case where the order is either not legal or not proper in the circumstances of the case.

(3.) AN appeal is creation of a statute and there is no inherent power in an Appellate Authority to entertain ah appeal which is not expressly provided by law.