LAWS(P&H)-1964-7-24

GURU DATT Vs. SOHAN SINGH AND ANR.

Decided On July 21, 1964
Guru Datt Appellant
V/S
Sohan Singh And Anr. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts giving rise to this reference to Division Bench are stated in my referring order dated 2nd March 1964 in which I expressly directed that the matter being urgent should be expedited so that the petition should be disposed of within two weeks. As a matter of fact, even the admitting Bench had on 12th November, 1963, directed that the petition should be disposed of within two months. It is unfortunate that in spite of the order of the admitting Bench, the case should not have been disposed of till today. It is desirable that cases relating to elections whether the election pertains to Parliament, Legislative Assembly or Panchayat Samiti must be disposed of with due despatch because our system of Government attaches great constitutional importance to representative form of Government and it is in the Panchayat that a common villager in this country will get training in the art of local self -Government. It is, therefore, desirable that election controversies are disposed of with the utmost despatch possible.

(2.) THIS petition must be allowed because the Addition Deputy Commissioner, who disposed of the election petition had no jurisdiction to do so; such jurisdiction having been vested only in the Deputy Commissioner. An election petition presented under Section 121 of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961, must be presented to the Deputy Commissioner within whose jurisdiction the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad is situated as per Rule 4 of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads (Election Petition Rules) 1961. The Deputy Commissioner, according to this Rule, is the prescribed authority under Section 121. The Deputy Commissioner under Section 2(3) means the Deputy Commissioner of a district including any officer not below the rank of an Extra Assistant Commissioner specially appointed by the Government to perform the functions of a Deputy Commissioner under this Act, but such officer is expressly debarred by means of the proviso from performing any function in respect of which the decision of the Deputy Commissioner under this Act is made final. Rule 8(e) of the Election Petition Rules mentioned above makes the order of the prescribed authority final. These rules, it may be pointed out, have been made under Section 115 of the Act and Sub -section (2)(b)(ii) and (iii) specifically empower framing of rules relating to investigation of allegations of corrupt practices and for avoiding elections, etc. These rules under Sub -section (4) have to be laid before each House of the State Legislature for a specified number of days and are liable to be modified by the Houses of Legislature. It is thus obvious that these rules have the same force as the main statute and indeed this is not disputed before us at the bar. Prima facie, therefore, it is the Deputy Commissioner alone, who has been given the jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the election petition. The Respondents have, to begin with, pleaded that the election petition was initially presented to Shri Sunder Singh, who was the Deputy Commissioner, but later he became the Additional Deputy Commissioner and the proceedings continued before him. Afterwards, Shri Lal Singh Ahuja, succeeded Shri Sunder Singh, to the office of Additional Deputy Commissioner and, therefore, he after conducting the proceedings disposed of the election petition in accordance with law. It is in the circumstances contended that the election petition was presented to the prescribed authority, having jurisdiction, and, therefore, there is no violation of any statutory provision. I am not impressed by this contention.

(3.) IT has next been contended that the Additional Deputy Commissioner has been performing the functions of the Deputy Commissioner and, therefore, the orders passed by the former must be deemed to be orders passed by the latter. Here again, I am unable to sustain the argument. The Deputy Commissioner, in the case in hand, is, in my opinion, a persona designata and, therefore, it is the Deputy Commissioner alone, who can as such perform the functions which the statute and the rules made thereunder confer on him. The order of the Governor Annexure "R. 1" dated 13th December, 1962, declaring the ex -cadre posts of Additional Deputy Commissioners to be equivalent in status and responsibility to the cadre posts of Deputy Commissioners, seems to me to be unhelpful to the Respondents. This order does not, and indeed cannot, modify the statutory provision, according to which, an election petition has to be presented to the Deputy Commissioner because an officer specially appointed to perform the functions of a Deputy Commissioner is expressly debarred from performing any function in respect of which the decision of the Deputy Commissioner is made final. It may be remembered that when judicial and quasi -judicial functions are entrusted to a specified officer as persona designata, then such functions are prima facie meant to be performed only by the officer designated, and such designated authority possesses no inherent or implied power to delegate its functions to someone else. Performance of such functions by any other authority would prima facie be unauthorised and non -est. By way of analogy, reference may be made to cases dealing with appeals under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act: Devi and Ors. v. Desa, (1954) 56 P.L.R. 284, and Ors. similar cases.