(1.) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by Parvati Devi, petitioners to which the respondent are Tibbia College Board Delhi and the Competent Authority Slum Areas, New Delhi, 1964, under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (Act 96 of 1956) against the petitioners that is challenged in this petitioners on the sole ground which is to prevail under that section for making an order, as that has been rendered clear by the judgment of their Lordships in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602, in which, at page 1611, their Lordships observed-
(2.) THE husband of the petitioners was compounder with respondent 1 in its hospital. He died on June 6,1959. He was in occupation of quarter No. B. 12 of the quarters provided by respondent 1 solely for its employees. Those quarters are not meant to be let out to the public in general and have been provided by respondent 1 with the specific object of an amenity to its staff working in its hospital. Two days after the death of her husband, that is to say on June 8, 1959, the petitioner made an application copy Annexure R-4 to the Principal of respondent 1's college that she be allowed to work as a paid apprentice Aya for one or two months. On June 20, 1959, her request was accepted to give her a trial as an Aya for three months. She was called upon the evacuate quarter No. B. 12 and instead she was allotted on trial on the specific condition that she was to copy of the letter is Annexure R-5 and it shows that the petitioners accepted those conditions. Subsequently another letter of November 20, 1959, copy Annexure R 6 appointed her on temporary basis for one year obviously leaving her in occupation of quarter No. D-151. But by December 28 and 29, 1959, the hospital authorities of respondent I abolished the department in which the petitioners was employed temporarily and as a consequence cancelled her appointment. She was then asked to vacate the quarter in her occupation. As she did not do so an application was made to the Rent Controller for her eviction on a number of grounds including the ground of subletting. It appears that there was a compromise between the parties before the Rent Controller and in her statement of which the copy in English translation is R-2/a, she admitted all the grounds in the eviction petition of respondent 1. However the Rent Controller proceeded to pass an order of eviction against the petitioners on the ground that the quarter was needed by respondent 1 for housing its employees. In this petitioners the petitioners has filed an affidavit denying that she admitted at that time the subletting of the quarter and the position that she now takes is that as she was alone and a widow, so her brother lived with her. She says that she never sublet the quarter. She was, however, allowed by the Rend Controller one year on a settlement between the parties to vacate the quarter. She not having vacated the quarter after expiry of one year respondent 1 moved an application under S. 19 of the Act for permission to execute the decree against her an dress 2 has allowed that application. It is that order of respondent 2 of which the legality and validity is question in this question.
(3.) THERE is only one argument which has been urged at this stage in this petitioners on behalf of the petitioners and that is the respondent 2 has not proceeded to a decision under S. 19 of the Act on the basis of the criterion laid done by their Lordships in Jyoti Pershad's case, AIR 1961 S C 1602 as has respondent 2 finds that the petitioners is a poor lady; she is in occupation of one room quarter. Although eviction form that quarter likely to create another slum but I should say that that is apparent form the tenor of the order. It is the substance of the matter that has to be taken and not necessarily the use of the particular would n expressing what the authority is saying. So that if what their Lordships have observed in Jyoti Pershad's case AIR 1961 S C 1602 is to be strictly applied to the present case it is said on the side of the petitioners that the order of respondent 2 cannot possibly stand. But Jyoti Pershad's case AIR 1961 S C 1602 on facts has no relation to a situation as in the present case. It does not deal with the position of a residential accommodation provided by an institution as respondent 1, when such accommodation is maintained not for the purpose of letting out for profit and gain but only as an ancillary to the institution so as to provided an amenity to its servants. In fact such an occupation becomes almost a part of the contract of service of the employees of such an institution. Now if the argument for the petitioners were to succeed and it should so happen that a considerable number of employees of such an institution were either to resign or were to be dismissed an impossible situation will arise in this that the institution would lose such accommodation for all practical purposes for which the accommodation was being maintained. In other words the institution would not be able to provide any such amenity to its employees. I do not consider that their Lordships had a case of this type in contemplation when observations were made a shave been reproduced above. Here is a petitioner who has accepted the accommodation as an amenity accompanying temporary service provided for her and in no Circumstances has she any right or consideration in her favour to remain in possession of such an accommodation after she has ceased to be in the service of the institution. Such accommodation is meant for another person who takes up service of the institution in lieu of the petitioners. In fact in this case the petitioners has thrown over board all her previous agreements with respondent 1 and although she has held occupation of the quarter for more than a year, she still is crating every conceivable obstruction to make the quarter available to the institution. In the Circumstances. I think respondent 2 has no option but to accept the application respondent 1 under S. 19 of the Act and give permission for execution of the decree against the petitioners.