(1.) THIS order will dispose of Second Appeals from order Nos. 214 -D of 1963 and 215 -D of 1963.
(2.) THE first point that Mr. S.N. Chopra, the learned counsel for the tenants, has sought to raise is that according to the provisions contained in section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub -section (1) of section 14 on the grounds specified in clause (e), namely, personal requirement unless a period of 5 years had elapsed from the date of the acquisition. According to Mr. Chopra, the sale certificate was granted to the present respondent in the year 1961 and until a period of 5 years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition, it was not open to the respondent to ask for eviction on the ground that the premises were required bona fide for occupation as residence either for herself or for members of her family depending on her. Now, although this point was raised in the written statement by Jaswant Singh in clear words and was even adverted to by the Additional Rent Controller but before the Rent Control Tribunal neither in the grounds of appeal nor at the stage of arguments this point appears to have been raised or pressed. In these circumstances I do not consider that the question, though one of law, ought to be allowed to be raised at this stage. At any rate, it seems to me that there is not much force in the point. A Division Bench of this Court has held in Mst. Ranjit Kaur v. Harbel Singh : (1963) 65 P.L.R. 1023, that where the conveyance deed specifically provided that the property was being transferred with effect from 1st October, 1955 by virtue of rule 34 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, the property would be deemed to have been transferred with effect from 1st October, 1955, although the conveyance deed in that case had been executed much later on 14th June, 196(sic). Although this question came up for consideration in a somewhat different context but clearly the view expressed was that the transfer should be deemed to have taken effect from the date which is mentioned in the deed of conveyance itself. In my opinion, this matter is covered by the Bench decision of this Court and the contention raised by Mr. Chopra cannot be acceded to.
(3.) MR . Chopra has also sought to agitate the point of lack of bona fides on the part of the respondent in making the applications for eviction. It is contended by him that in 1959 certain other portion of the house in dispute fell vacant because of the eviction of the tenants there from and that the respondent allowed her sister and her husband to occupy the same as a tenant. It is further pointed out that the applications for fixation of standard rent were made only some time before the applications for eviction were filed and that these applications were filed after the rent had been fixed at a fairly high figure by mutual consent. The Additional Rent Controller as also the Rent Control Tribunal took into consideration all the relevant matters including the accommodation which is in possession of the respondent at present and the bona fide requirements of the members of her family and came to a conclusion in favour of the respondent. No substantial question of law can be said to arise on this finding.