(1.) THIS second appeal is directed against the decision of the Additional District judge, Amritsar reversing on appeal the decision of the trail Court dismissing the plaintiffs' suit.
(2.) THE plaintiffs are the members of a partnership known as Bharat Industries chemical Colours, Chhenarta and are registered under the Factories Act. The chheharta Municipal Committee had by a notification dated 15th of May 1946 imposed profession tax under section 61 (1) (b) of the Punjab Municipal Act. In the initial stages the tax was Rs. 15/- in the year 1958 by another notification. . The partners disputed the liability to pay Rs. 1200/- as tax and according tot hem only rs. 200/- was payable because the profession of the partnership was one. This contention did not prevail with the Assessing Authority with the result that the present suit for injunction restraining the Municipal Committee from realising tax more than Rs. 200/- was filed. The Municipal Committee in defence raised the pleas that he civil courts had no jurisdiction that the tax was on individuals, i. e. persons and not on business or trade, and that no injunction in circumstances could be granted. The trial court held that civil courts' jurisdiction was barred by reason of sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act and that tax at the rate of Rs. 200/- per partner could be recovered and in this view of the matter dismissed the suit. Against that decision an appeal was taken to the District Judge which came up for hearing before the Additional District Judge Amritsar. The learned Additional District Judge did not deal with the question of jurisdiction. He deal with the question whether an independent tax on each of the partnership could be imposed. He came to the conclusion that a collective tax on the partnership could be imposed and for this he relied on Davies v. President of the Madras Municipal Commission, ILR 14 Mad 140. In this view of the matter, decision of the trial Court was reversed and plaintiffs' suit was decreed. It is against this decision of the trial Court was reversed and plaintiffs' suit was decreed. It is against this decision that the municipal Committee has come up in second appeal.
(3.) MR. Anand Saroop, learned counsel for the Committee in the first instance raised the contention that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. He relies on the provisions of sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal act and the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Firm Seth Radha kishan v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, AIR 1963 Sc. 1546 and of the is Court in Kelash Nath v. Municipal Committee, Batala, AIR 1962 Punj 389 (FB ). So far as the decision of the Supreme Court is concerned it does not support mr. Anand Saroop. Their Lordships made it abundantly clear that a suit in the civil court will lie if a special Tribunal abuses its power or dies not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions. This will show that the question whether the tax has been imposed under the provisions of the Act is interconnected with the question of jurisdiction. As I am taking the view that payment in excess of Rs. 200/- is not justified under the Act a fortiori the civil courts can entertain the suit. In this connection reference may also be made to the Full Bench decision of the lahore High court in Municipal Committee, Montogomery v. in somewhat similar circumstances it was held that the civil courts had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter that arose in that case and a similar argument based on sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act was repelled. I, therefore see no force in the argument that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred to entertain and deal with the present suit.