PUNJAB STATE Vs. JASBIR SINGH AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE four appeals (Regular First Appeals Nos. 152, 153, 171 and 172 of 1957) and C. M No. 1855 -C of 1963 in R. F. A. 172 of 1957 have been argued together and may be disposed of by one and the same judgment.

(2.) IN R. F. A. No. 172 of 1957 preferred by the Punjab State against Jasbir Singh, Pritam Singh Brijmohan Singh, Daljit Singh, Bhan Singh and Bela Singh, the last mentioned Bela Singh died sometime in 1958. An application for bringing on record his legal representatives was filed in this Court in October, 1963, the application bearing the date 23rd October, 1903. Five persons were mentioned as legal representatives of the deceased. The explanation given for the delay was stated to be that the authorities were made aware of the death of Bela Singh on 22nd October 1963 when the Superintendent of the Deputy Commissioner's office, Patiala, was told on telephone about it by the Personal Assistant to the Advocate General. The same information was repeated on 23rd October, 1963 by the Additional Advocate General to the Deputy Commissioner, Patiala, on telephone. Prior to this, the applicant, State of Punjab, had no information about the death. The delay in filing the application has been described not to be intentional. This application is supported by an affidavit of Darshan Singh, Naib Tehsildar, Recovery, Patiala.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the appellant -petitioner has been wholly unable to satisfy us about the reasons which would justify this Court in condoning the inordinate delay in approaching this Court for bringing on record the legal representatives of Bela Singh deceased. Under Article 177 of the Indian Limitation Act, the period of limitation for filing an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of a deceased respondent is 90 days computed from the date of the death of the deceased and under Article 171, the period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside an abatement is 60 days computed from the date of abatement. If no application is made for bringing on record the legal representatives of a deceased party, within the time limited by law, the appeal automatically abates as against the deceased. Order 22, Rule 4, C. P. C. The result, therefore, is that the appellant had only a maximum number of 150 days within which to approach this Court for setting aside the abatement and bringing on record the legal representatives of Bela Singh; but by virtue of Order 22, Rule 9(3), C. P. C, the provisions of Section 5, Limitation Act, are made applicable to applications under sub -rule (2) of this rule for setting aside abatements. Section 5, Limitation Act, empowers the Courts to admit applications to which it applies after the prescribed period on being satisfied that the applicant concerned had a sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. The State, as has been settled by high authority, is not entitled in this respect to any concession more than a private party, and there can scarcely be any question of construing the expression "sufficient cause" more liberally merely because the party in default is the Government. These provisions have been enacted with a view to advance the cause of justice and, therefore, on the circumstances of a given case the inherent disabilities of the party in default may, in my opinion, justifiably be given due weight. True it is, that in construing whether the petitioner has established sufficient cause for not applying for setting aside the abatement within time, the Court need not be over strict in expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it requires to enable it to uphold facts touching the merits of a controversy; but this clearly does not mean that the Court should readily accept whatever the petitioner alleges to explain away his default. I do not mean to lay down that the appellant has a duty to make regular enquiries from time to time about the health or existence of the opposite party; but at the same time the terminus a qua is clearly not the date of the appellant's knowledge of the respondent's death and mere late knowledge cannot by itself justify delayed application for setting aside the abatement, with the result that mere allegation that the petitioner did not come to know of the death of the opposite party is obviously insufficient. When confronted with this position, the appellant's learned counsel had practically nothing to urge in support of this application which fails and is hereby dismissed.