NIHAL CHAND MUNSHI RAM Vs. VISHANDAS MENRAJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) NIHAL Chand, appellant, was a tenant of the first floor of a house situate in Mori gate, Delhi which had been declared a "slum area" under the Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). On 510-1956 Vishan Dass, Respondent No. 1 who was his landlord, brought a suit for his ejectment on the ground that he required this portion of the house as well for his personal need and for the use of the members of his family. The other ground for ejectment was that one of the walls of his house had cracked out without the house being vacated. This suit resulted in a consent decree, which was passed on 15-11-1956, under the terms of which the tenant agreed to vacate the premises after 2 1/2 years. In the meantime, the Act came into force and on 7-4-1959 an application was made under section 19 for permission to execute the consent decree. Thereafter the appellant filed a suit that the said compromise decree was nullity. This suit was dismissed on 29-8-1960 and an appeal against the same was also rejected on 28-8-1961. On 23-8-1960, however, the Competent Authority under the Act respondent No. 3 dismissed the landlord's application under section 19 on the ground that "the landlord's suit was misconceived, both on the grounds of bonafide necessity and the premises requiring repairs. " An appeal against the same was also dismissed by the Administrator Union Territory, Delhi, respondent no. 2 on 21-11-1961, observing thus:-

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has raised two contentions before us-- (1)that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that the Authorities under the act had ignored the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court in Jyoti Pershad's case, AIR 1961 SC 1602 while refusing permission to the landlord to execute the ejectment decree under section 19 of the Act and (2) that the landlord had not brought the Supreme Court ruling, mentioned above, to the notice of the authorities under the Act and had not raised any objection on its basis. The learned Single Judge, therefore, in error in allowing him to raise this new point in writ proceedings.

(3.) AS regards the first contention, it will be clear from the order of respondent no. 2, mentioned above, that the ground on which he had confirmed the order of respondent No. 3 was that in his view though it was true that both the landlord and the tenant had large families and were living under very inconvenient conditions, but the tenant, who was a respectable person, had not been able to find any alternative accommodation and, consequently he and his family would be in a serious predicament if he was ejected from the premises. It is no doubt correct that it is very difficult to get accommodation in Delhi, but that alone, in my view, is no ground for refusing permission to the landlord to execute the eviction decree obtained by him from the Civil Courts. Undoubtedly, the Act has not laid down any criteria, which had to be borne in mind by the Authorities while granting or refusing permission to a landlord for executing the ejectment decrees passed under the Rent Control Act. The Supreme Court authority, referred to above, however, mentioned the following principles in this respect:-