LAWS(P&H)-2014-11-78

RANJIT SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

Decided On November 19, 2014
RANJIT SINGH Appellant
V/S
State of Punjab and Ors. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner impugns the award of the Labour Court dated 20.7.1993. He pleaded that he had worked as a dak runner for 89 days w.e.f 1.7.82 to 24.6.1983 with notional breaks of one day after each term of 89 days, in the pay scale of 300-430. Subsequently the petitioner continued to discharge his duties as a Chowkidar on similar terms w.e.f 15.9.1983 till 28.2.1986. His services were eventually terminated on May, 1987. Respondents partially admitted the claim of the petitioner and gave out in their reply the period during which he worked. It is necessary to extract the details of the periods that the petitioner was made to work:- <FRM>JUDGEMENT_78_LAWS(P&H)11_2014_1.html</FRM>

(2.) A perusal of the award reveals that the reasoning adopted by it to dismiss the claim of the petitioner is totally perverse. No attempt has been made by the Tribunal to address the core issue as to whether the petitioner was a workman as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. No finding was recorded by the Tribunal as to whether the petitioner had completed 240 days of employment in the year preceding his termination. As per the conceded case which has emerged from the pleadings of the parties before the Tribunal the petitioner had worked for a substantial number of years and lastly before his termination he had worked as a Muzdoor from 11/1986 to 6/1987.

(3.) The plea of the respondents is that the petitioner was engaged against the scheme which has since been shut down. Therefore the services of the petitioners were terminated in accordance with principle of last come first go. Even this finding has not been recorded by the Tribunal. No evidence in this regard has been discussed. If this was the plea taken by the respondents then it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to atleast note whether the petitioner was indeed the last person or junior employee to warrant his termination. This Court, thus, has little hesitation to hold that the award of the Tribunal is totally arbitrary and unjust since there is material on record regarding the period of engagement of the petitioner which is undisputed. The Court would unhesitatingly accept the same. It is evident that the respondents have not offered any justification for termination and have not shown any material to indicate that provisions of Section 25F were ever complied with. Considering the length of engagement and the fact that provisions of Section 25 F do not stand complied with, and similarly nothing is on record to justify the plea of discontinuance of scheme and petitioner being the last in the seniority to warrant his departure from service first, the petitioner's termination would necessarily have to be termed illegal.