(1.) The petitioner, who was dismissed from service vide order dated 13.5.2010, and appeal against which was dismissed vide order dated 25.8.2011, has approached this Court impugning the aforesaid two orders. The petitioner was appointed as PT1 on 1.8.1977. He was General Secretary of the Haryana Rajkiya Adhyapak Sangh of Block Jagadhri. He was involved in two cases bearing F.I.R. No. 268 dated 13.9.2006, under Section 294 IPC, and F.I.R. No. 269 dated 14.9.2006, under Section 354 IPC, both registered at Police Station, Farakpur. He was convicted in both the cases and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- under Section 294 IPC vide judgment/order dated 4/5.3.2010 and rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- under Section 354 IPC vide judgment/order dated 20/22.1.2010. After the conviction of the petitioner, he was dismissed from service vide order dated 13.5.2010. The order was upheld in appeal vide order dated 25.8.2011.
(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has been punished because he had not participated in the strike of the teachers in the year 2005. He was falsely implicated in the cases by the rival group, otherwise ever since he was appointed in service, he had good track record. No adverse remarks were ever conveyed. In the impugned order of dismissal passed by the authorities, conduct of the petitioner leading to his conviction has not been referred to, which is mandatory.
(3.) After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned orders, firstly, on the ground of delay and laches. The order of dismissal of the petitioner is dated 13.5.2010, whereas the appeal against the same was dismissed vide order dated 25.8.2011. The present petition was filed in this Court on 25.9.2014. The same having been filed more than three years after the passing of the order by the Appellate Authority, deserves to be dismissed on account of delay and laches only. For the purpose, reference can be made to judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2006 11 SCC 464, wherein the issue regarding delay in invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction was considered. It was a case in which certain employees raised the issue that they were not liable to be retired at the age of 58 years but should be permitted to continue in service till they attain the age of 60 years. They were still in service when the writ petitions were filed. The writ petitions were ultimately allowed. Placing reliance upon that judgment, some of the employees, who already stood retired, filed writ petitions claiming same benefit. The writ petitions were allowed by the High Court in terms of its earlier judgment. The judgment of the High Court was impugned before Hon'ble the Supreme Court, wherein while referring to earlier judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, 1989 2 SCC 356; State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya, 1996 6 SCC 267; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1997 6 SCC 538 and Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy, 2004 1 SCC 347, it was opined that the persons who approach the court at a belated stage placing reliance upon an order passed in some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary relief on account of delay and laches. Relevant paragraphs thereof are extracted below: