(1.) The respondent-driver Jasraj Singh has not been served and the return is that he has retired from service. Since the appeal is at the instance of the Roadways, notice to the said respondent is dispensed with.
(2.) All the appeals would require to be dismissed on a singular consideration of whether the Punjab Roadways which was the owner of the vehicle, could not be made liable for a bomb-blast that took place in the bus. The meaning of death or injury by the use of a motor vehicle has obtained an expansive meaning and there are typical instances of cases where the owners of the vehicle have been made liable for such acts. There could be exclusion of liability for an insurer for civil war or such like instances as are set out under Section 149(2). There shall however be no exclusion of liability for an owner to contend that the death resulting out of a bomb blast cannot leave a valid trail of cause of action. A person that gets into the bus subjects himself to the due care of the owner and the persons who manned the vehicle. The liability is founded on a tort law principle of duty of care that is owed to a person and where there has been a breach of such duty. An act of terrorism ought not to be taken as an act of God. It is the antithesis of anything godly. The liability shall, therefore, be surely anchored to the owner whose vehicle was a death trap to the passengers.
(3.) All these cases have been filed long after the incident. There is no period of limitation for entertaining the claims before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal as laid down by the decision of the Supreme Court in Dhannalal Versus D.P.Vijayvargiya and others, 1996 4 SCC 652.