UNION OF INDIA Vs. JASMER KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) UNION of India through its Defence Estate Officer, Bathinda Circle, Bathinda seeks quashing of the order dated 31.03.1989 passed by Special Land Acquisition Collector, Jalandhar whereby an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') moved by the first respondent, has been allowed and she has been held entitled to the same amount of compensation for her acquired land as was assessed by this Court in Regular First Appeal No. 440 of 1986 (Zora Singh and others Versus Union of India and others) decided on 21.05.1987.

(2.) FIRST respondent owned the land forming part of 2528.25626 acres of land of village Bhucho Kalan which was acquired by Union of India for Bathinda Cantonment. The acquisition was made under the 1894 Act. The award was passed on 30.03.1981. The first respondent did not seek any reference under Section 18 of the Act though some of the land owners filed the reference which was decided by Additional District Judge, Bathinda on 29.04.1986. Still dissatisfied, they approached this Court in R.F.A. No. 440 of 1986 which was allowed in part vide order dated 21.05.1987. After the abovesaid decision and on obtaining certified copy of that order, the first respondent filed an application under Section 28A of the Act on 09.12.1987. The said application has been allowed by Special Land Acquisition Collector, Jalandhar vide impugned order dated 31.03.1989 holding that the application was moved within the prescribed period of limitation and that the first respondent was entitled to the same amount of compensation as was awarded by this Court to the other land owners of same acquisition.

(3.) IN our considered view, the writ petition suffers from unexplained, inordinate delay and laches. Even if it is assumed that the authorities/Union of India came to know of the impugned order in December 2003, there is still no explanation as to why the writ petition was filed after about five years of such knowledge? It is true that the Courts are ordinarily more liberal and be inclined to condone the delay in a lis initiated by the State -it being an impersonal character. However, such a leniency cannot be stretched to the extent that it defeats the very object of substantive provisions of Limitation Act or the well settled principles on delay and laches. The writ petition, thus, deserves to be dismissed on this score alone.