LAWS(P&H)-2014-7-172

PARTAP SINGH Vs. NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Decided On July 16, 2014
PARTAP SINGH Appellant
V/S
National Insurance Company and Others Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant presents a point which is patently against the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act. The case merits setting out the law lucidly for future guidance to subordinate courts. It is an admitted case that the vehicle involved in the accident was a goods vehicle. A goods carriage is defined under Section 2 (14) of the Act as a vehicle constructed or adapted for the sole purpose of carrying of goods. A vehicle which is used for carrying on goods is a "transport vehicle" in terms of Section 2 (47). The said section reads that a transport vehicle means, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus and a private service vehicle. A vehicle that carries goods, therefore, conforms to two definitions, namely, goods carriage as well as transport vehicle. A transport vehicle is so defined in order that the legal regulation relating to licencing and permit under the Motor Vehicle Act are complied with. A transport vehicle can be driven only by a person who holds a driving licence in the manner required under Section 3 of the Motor Vehicle Act. Such a vehicle also requires a permit in terms of Section 66 of the Motor Vehicle Act. Section 66 falls within Chapter V, which allows the power of the State to control transport vehicles. Section 66 mandates the necessity of permit and reads as under:-

(2.) The necessity of a permit is to be seen in the context of what is permissible for an insurer to plead in a defence for an action involving the vehicle which is insured but it does not have a permit. Section 149 (2) sets out the line of defences which an insurance company could take. One of the defences, which is permissible, is set out in clause 2, sub-clause (a) (i) (c) which reads as under:-

(3.) If the vehicle is not allowed by the permit by which the vehicle is used where vehicle is a transport vehicle, then that shall allow for insurer to plead that there had been a breach of condition in terms of policy. If a permit does not exist, but it was put to a purpose which could have been allowed only by the permit, then an insurance company could plead a violation. It must be taken as inbuilt provision that complete lack of permit makes impermissible for a person to use a vehicle which the law mandates the requirement of a permit. It is one thing to state that there existed a permit but there had been some violation of terms of permit but quite another to state that there existed no permit at all.