UMED SINGH Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal filed by the appellants against the judgment of conviction dated 23.7.1996 and order of sentence dated 26.7.1996. The appellant No. 1 has been convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC "for short") and appellant No. 2 has been convicted for the offence under Section 201 IPC vide order dated 23.7.1996. Appellant No. 1 has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC. Appellant No. 2 has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC.

(2.) SHRI Jitender Chauhan, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellants submits that appellant No. 1 was in custody since 29.4.1995 i.e. the date of registration of the FIR Ex. PA/2. Even after the orders of his conviction and sentence on 23.7.1996 and 26.7.1996 respectively, he was in custody and was granted bail to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala by this Court vide order dated 4.10.2000. However, he could not arrange necessary sureties and, therefore, continued to remain in jail. Appellant No. 1 now has undergone the entire sentence of imprisonment and since been released. In the circumstances the learned counsel for the appellant states that he does not press the appeal of appellant No. 1 qua his conviction and sentence of imprisonment. He, however, prays for modification of the order of sentence of fine by dispensing with the payment of fine with respect to appellant No. 1.

(3.) IN response, Shri Sudhir Nehra, learned Assistant Advocate General, Haryana contends that the sentence of fine qua appellant No. 1 is not liable to be modified by dispensing with the payment of fine and appellant No. 2 is not liable to be acquitted as the evidence on record has been correctly appreciated by the learned trial Court, which calls for no interference. He further contended that she has indulged in the commission of the crime and her conviction and sentence is liable to be sustained.