KRISHAN LAL Vs. HARVINDER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is tenants' petition filed under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for brevity, 'the Act') challenging concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below holding that the tenant-petitioners are liable to be evicted from the demised shop on the ground of personal necessity as envisaged by Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. Both the Courts have given categorical findings that the need of the landlord-respondents is bona fide as the demised shop is required by landlord-respondent No. 1 for carrying on the business of Karyana and Dairy products. The argument of the tenant-petitioners, that there is a room on the first floor (Chaubara) and the same is commercial in nature where the landlord-respondent could carry on the business of Karyana and Dairy products, has been rejected by the learned Appellate Authority holding that the room on the first floor (Chaubara) cannot be equated with the shop, especially when no objection to that effect has been raised in the written statement filed before the Rent Controller. The view of the Appellate Authority on this issue reads as under :-

(2.) THE other argument that there is concealment of facts by the landlord- respondents, inasmuch as no reference to the room (Chaubara) on the first floor has been made in the pleadings, has also been rejected on the ground that both the parties were well aware about the room on the first floor and in such circumstances, there could be no allegation with regard to concealment of fact. It is patent that the tenants are occupying the demised shop on the ground floor on the first floor of which there is a room (Chaubara). In respect of the Chaubara/room on the first floor, the allegation of concealment was made which has been rejected as the tenants were fully aware and no prejudice is suffered by them. Another arguments raised before the Appellate Authority has also been rejected that the necessity of the landlord- respondents is merely a wish and not substantial because landlord-respondent No. 1 does not have funds or any cash balance in the bank. The plying of taxi by landlord-respondent No. 1 and his employment with M/s. Cadbury India Limited have also not found favour with the Appellate Authority to decline his prayer for occupying the demised shop for his personal necessity by opening the business of Karyana and Dairy products.

(3.) AFTER hearing the learned counsel, I am of the considered view that this Court in revisional jurisdiction, provided by Section 15(5) of the Act, cannot reappreciate evidence in order to reach a conclusion different than the one concurrently recorded by the Courts below. The Supreme Court has gone to the extent of observing that even if principal facts have been proved and inferential facts have been assumed by the Courts below, it would not be possible for this Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act. The aforementioned view has been taken in the cases of Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, 1988(3) SCC 131; Rajbir Kaur v. S. Chokesiri and Co., 1988(2) RCR(Rent) 328 (SC) : 1989(1) SCC 19; M/s. Nihal Chand Rameshwar Dass and another v. Vinod Rastogi, 1994(2) RCR(Rent) 540 (SC) : JT 1994(4) SC 113; Vaneet Jain v. Jagjit Singh, 2000(1) RCR(Rent) 507 (SC) : 2000(5) SCC 1 and Mohinder Singh v. Madan Lal Sharma, 2002(10) SCC 676. In Ram Dass's case (supra) the Supreme Court was seized of a matter in which ejectment of the tenant had been ordered by the Courts below. The observations of the Supreme Court show that interference under Section 15(5) of the Act is not warranted even when inference has been drawn by assuming other facts by the Courts below from the principal facts. The following paras which apply to the present case deserve to be quoted in extenso :-