CHAND Vs. SPECIAL SECRETARY TO GOVT. OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ON the request of the counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal.

(2.) IT is not disputed that the petitioner has been duly elected as Sarpanch. He claimed himself to be a Majbi Sikh belonging to Schedule Caste category. Subsequently, however, a complaint has been made that the petitioner, in fact, belonged to the Backward Class. Consequently, FIR No. 245 dated 4.8.2003 has been registered against the petitioner under Sections 420, 467, 468, 477 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code. On registration of the FIR, the petitioner has been directed to be suspended vide order dated 28.10.2003 (Annexure P-2 This order has been passed by the Deputy Director Panchayats exercising the powers of the Director Panchayats under Section 20(3) of the Punjab Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The appeal filed against this order, has been dismissed by the Special Secretary to Government Punjab by order dated 3.3.2004 (Annexure P-3). In this writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks the quashing of the order dated 28.10.2003 on the ground that even if the respondents have the jurisdiction to suspend the Sarpanch under Section 20(3) of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the registration of a criminal case, the power can only be exercised after observing rule of natural justice. Mr. Bedi submits that it was necessary for the respondents to issue show cause notice to the petitioner seeking his explanation before passing the impugned order (Annexure P-2). He submits that the impugned order is liable to be quashed as it does not set out any reasons as to how the continuance of the petitioner would be an embrassment to the petitioner or the Panchayat. According to the learned counsel the order passed by the Special Secretary is also unsustainable for the same reasons.

(3.) WE have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. We do not find any merit in the submissions of Mr. Sran. Mere registration of an FIR is not proof of the guilt of the petitioner. Registration of a false FIR is not a phenomenon unknown in India. This apart the 'facts' narrated in the FIR are yet to be scrutinized in judicial proceedings. The registration of the FIR alone would not be sufficient for passing an order of suspension under Section 20(3) of the Act. The petitioner is duly elected as Sarpanch. Very serious allegations have been made against him. Gravity of the allegations and the seriousness of the consequences would make it imperative that the Sarpanch is heard before an order is passed under Section 20(3) of the Act.