ANIL KUMAR KATYAL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner Anil Kumar Katyal alongwith Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri S. P. Chhatwal entered into an agreement for the purchase of 20 kanals 10 marlas of land situated in village Naya Gaon, Tehsil Kharar, District Ropar, with Jagir Singh, Mehar Singh Hardit Singh and Hakam Singh sons of Jiwan Singh. According to the terms and conditions of the agreement the sale deed was to be got executed on or before 31.5.1990 and it was stipulated in the agreement that the purchaser shall have the option to purchase the property in his own name or in the name of his nominee or jointly with others. A sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid as earnest money for the purchase of that land. On the basis of this agreement dated 16.4.1990 the petitioner entered into another agreement to sell 250 square yards of land out of 20 kanals 10 marlas with Shri A. S. Sachdev for a total consideration of Rs. 80,000/- and he received Rs. 40,000/- as earnest money. This agreement was entered into on 24th April 1990 and the sale-deed was to be executed on or before 31st May, 1990 on payment of the balance amount of Rs. 40,000/-. On 2.5.1992 case FIR No. 44 was registered against the petitioner at Police Station, S.A.S. Nagar, under Sections 406 and 420, IPC Shri A. S. Sachdeva alleged that the petitioner fraudulently and dishonestly induced him and some others to purchase from him separate plots of their choice to be carved out of the land bearing Khasra Nos. 168/22/2, 22/1/1, 23 and 177/3 situated in village Naya Gaon, which he had purchased from Jagir Singh, Mehar Singh etc. He assured that this land did not come under the ambit of periphery controlled area, under the provisions of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952 and there did not exist any legal embargo qua the registration and execution of sale deeds. He received Rs. 40,000/- as earnest money from each of them and executed three agreements to sell on 24th April, 1990. He, however, did not execute any sale deed in his favour as agreed and intentionally avoided doing so under one pretext or the other. On 2.6.1990 a public notice was issued by the Director, Housing and Urban Development, Punjab, which was published in the Tribune warning the general public that unauthorised colonisers were indulging in the sale of plots in the periphery controlled area including Naya Gaon in violation of Sections 3 and 8(2) of the Punjab Regulation of Colonies Act, 1975 and Sections 6 and 11 of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952. The petitioner was apprised of this public notice and refund of earnest money was demanded which he had extracted fraudulently and dishonestly, but he did not refund the amount. As per the agreement to sell dated 24.4.1990 the sale was not permissible because of the above said encumbrance and legal embargo and the petitioner was guilty of an offence under Section 420, IPC.

(2.) THE petitioner moved the present petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing the above mentioned first information report and subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the grounds that it was a case of civil liability and official machinery of the police could not be allowed to be used for settlement of personal disputes which were of civil nature. Shri A. S. Sachdeva was himself a defaulter for not getting the sale-deed executed and no offence under Section 420, IPC was committed.

(3.) I have heard the counsel for the parties. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that there was no dishonest inducement on the part of the petitioner when Shri A. S. Sachdeva entered into an agreement for the purchase of land from him. The petitioner has made it clear to him that he was not the owner of the land and he had simply entered into an agreement to purchase the land from Jagir Singh, Mehar Singh etc. and he could get the sale deed executed from them in his favour directly. The learned counsel referred to the agreement Annexure P/2 which was entered into between the petitioner and Shri A. S. Sachdeva and in this agreement it was mentioned that the seller had earlier entered into an agreement to sell being purchaser of land measuring 20 kanals 10 marlas from Shri Jagir Singh, Mehar Singh etc. vide agreement dated 16.4.1990 and he had further agreed to sell 250 square yards of land out of that land to Shri A. S. Sachdeva for a consideration of Rs. 80,000/-. It was thus asserted that this fact was made clear to the complainant that the petitioner was not the owner of the land and he had simply agreed to purchase the land from some third party, so no deception or fraud was played. This contention of the learned counsel is, however, not valid. The main grievance of the complainant was that the petitioner had assured that the land was free from all sorts of encumbrances and that there was no bar on its transfer, but vide a notice issued by the Director, Housing and Urban Development, Punjab, it was in violation of the provisions of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952. He was trapped in the fraudulent and dishonest inducement by the petitioner that the land was free from any encumbrance. Prima facie clause (4) of the agreement Annexure P/2 shows that this representation was made by the petitioner and the complainant was induced to purchase the plot and part with Rs. 40,000/- as earnest money. The allegations in the first information report spelled out the ingredients of the offences mentioned therein and at this stage it cannot be said that no offence at all was made out against the petitioner. So far as the contention of the learned counsel to the dispute is only of civil nature, is concerned, I find that is without any merit. No civil suit is pending between the parties, regarding the specific performance of the agreement. The petitioner himself has not become the owner of the land so far by virtue of any sale deed having been executed in his favour and the complainant could not ask him to further transfer the land to him by seeking specific performance of the agreement. Moreover, a civil remedy does not bar a criminal remedy in each and every case. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but are clearly co-extensive and essentially differ in their contents and consequence. In the instant case the allegations made in the FIR made out a case against the petitioner and he has been rightly charge-sheeted. I find no merit in this petition and dismiss the same.