GURU NANAK DEV Vs. BALBIR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition for revision is directed against the order of the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, whereby order of the trial Court was set aside and in consequence thereof, injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff (respondent herein) restraining the Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar (in short 'the University') from terminating the services of the plaintiff and also from getting the house vacated in pursuance of letter dated 25.3.1992 till the decision of the suit.

(2.) In brief, the facts are that vide order dated 4.1.1992, plaintiff was appointed as Security Officer by the Vice Chancellor of the University. As per the appointment order, plaintiff was to remain on probation for one year which could be further extended for a period of three years in all. Subsequently, vide order dated 4.2.1992, his period of probation was extended. However, vide order dated 24.3.1992, services of the plaintiff were dispensed with and he was asked to vacate House No. C-35 situated in the university campus, allotted to him at the time of his appointment. This led to the filing of a suit by the plaintiff in which he challenged the order dated 24.3.1992 terminating his services as well as order dated 25.3.1992 vide which he was asked to vacate the house in question. Along with the suit, he also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for grant of ad-interim injunction, restraining the university from implementing the aforesaid orders. This application, on contest, was dismissed by the trial Court. On appeal by the plaintiff, the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, set aside the order of the trial Court and in consequence thereof, restrained the university from Implementing its orders till the decision of the suit. The order of the Additional District Judge is now being impugned by the University in the present revision position.

(3.) Mr. H.S. Riar, Advocate, counsel for the petitioner-University contended that the Additional District Judge while allowing the appeal of the plaintiff (respondent herein) has not kept in view the principles for the grant or refusal of ad interim injunction as contained in Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to him, neither the plaintiff has a prima facie case in his favour, nor balance of convenience lies in restraining the university for implementing its orders. He also contended that no irreparable loss is going to be caused to the plaintiff if injunction is not granted in his favour. In reply, Mr. D.S. Pheruman, Advocate, counsel for the plaintiff, contended that order terminating the services of the plaintiff is bad in law inasmuch as he was a confirmed employee. According to him, the Vice Chancellor was not a competent person to extend the period of probation. He further contended that no reason at all was given that as to why it was considered necessary to extend the period of probation. Lastly, he contended that without recording any finding in regard to the work and conduct of the plaintiff, his period of probation could not be extended after the expiry of original period of one year.