(1.) By the present judgment we propose to dispose of LPA Nos. 948 and 959 of 1991 and CWP No. 18485 of 1991. The facts have been taken from the former case.
(2.) It has been urged by Mr. Sadana, learned counsel for the appellant, that his client was entitled to count his service under the Government from the year 1965 to 30th June, 1984 alongwith the service put in under the Corporation for the purpose of the computation of his pension and other retiral benefits. In support of this assertion, he has relied on Rule 5.3 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume II (for short the 'Rules') to contend that a permanent Government employee who was permanently absorbed in a service or post in or under a Corporation or Company, wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government, was entitled to receive such retirement benefits which were due to him from the date of absorption or on the date of his voluntary retirement, whichever was later. He has asserted that this concession was also made applicable to a temporary Government employee such as the appellant by virtue of Annexure P-1 dated 6th July, 1989. He has also urged, in addition, that in similar circumstances the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Gurmail Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1991 (3) Services Cases Today 608 while dealing with the case of employees similarly situated of the Punjab State Tubewells Corporation had granted them continuity of service alongwith attendant benefits.
(3.) The stand of the appellant has been controverted by the counsel for the opposite parties. It has been asserted that Rule 5.3. of the Rules did not create a right to payment or computation of pension nor did it provide that service put in under the Government and the Corporation should count as one for the purpose of computing the retiral benefits. It has also been urged that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurmail Singh's case (supra) was distinguishable on facts inasmuch as in that matter the services of the employees who were admittedly workmen had been retrenched without following the procedure under the Industrial Disputes Act and no contract of service had been entered into between them at the time when they were retrenched from the Punjab Government service and they had been absorbed in the Tubewell Corporation only after the judgments of the Courts in their favour. In elaboration, it has been urged that at the time of absorption of the appellant in the services of the Corporation, had been clearly made to understand that he was being given a fresh appointment on certain specific conditions. Reference has been made by Mr. A.L. Bahl, learned counsel for the Corporation in the present case, to Annexures R-1 to R-4 filed with the reply. Annexure R-1 conveys the sanction of the President of India to the transfer of the various Leather Centres (in one of which the appellant was also working) to the Corporation. Annexure R-2 is an office order issued by the Director of Industries Punjab wherein it has been specifically mentioned that the post held by the appellant alongwith other posts had been abolished and the incumbent thereon were being discharged, but would be deemed to have been taken on the rolls of the Corporation with effect from 1st July, 1984, and their services would be governed by the service Bye-laws of the concerned Corporation. It was also made specifically clear that the pay and inter se seniority of the absorbed employees as on 30th June, 1984, would be protected. Annexure R-3 is the letter of appointment issued to the appellant in which it was made clear that his absorption was, in fact, a fresh appointment requiring completion of probation if any period of one year, which could be extended by an other year, if necessary. Annexure R-4 is a communication addressed by the Corporation to the appellant wherein it was directed that in case he did not send his final and unconditional acceptance to all the terms and conditions of the appointment offered vide Annexure R-3, his services were liable to be dispensed with. It has been conceded before us that no formal acceptance was sent by the appellant but, in our opinion, as he continued to work on the terms and conditions set out for a very long time, it impliedly meant that he had accepted the terms of his appointment as a fresh appointee.