LAWS(P&H)-1993-5-123

JAGATJIT INDUSTRIES, LTD. Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

Decided On May 04, 1993
JAGATJIT INDUSTRIES, LTD Appellant
V/S
STATE OF PUNJAB Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner M/s. Jagatjit Industries Limited Hamira has impugned an order Annexure P-3 passed by the Secretary Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board. The petitioner is a licencee under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'). It purchases wheat, barley and maize from within the State of Punjab as also from Mandis outside the State of Punjab and brings the same to its factory at Hamira within the jurisdiction of Market Committee, Dhilwan for preparing malt, malt whisky and Maltova. The petitioner was sought to be assessed to market fee by the Market Committee, Dhilwan for the purchases made during the years 1980 to 1989. A liability of about one crore rupees was created against the petitioner on account of levy of market fee and penalty. This led to filing of a writ petition being 5828 of 1991 in this Court, which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court, on June 7, 1991. The demand notice was quashed with liberty to the Market Committee to pass a fresh order. The Market Committee thereafter took proceedings to assess the petitioner for levy of market fee by requiring it to appear on July 15, 1991. Petitioner filed objections supported by affidavits claiming therein that no market fee is leviable on purchases of agricultural produce made from outside the State of Punjab, by the Head Office of the petitioner-Company situated in Delhi. The Administrator of the Market Committee exercising the powers of the Committee by order in the form of a resolution, dated November 7, 1991 concluded that the petitioner was not liable for the payment of market fee in respect of purchases made by it from outside the State of Punjab. While coming to the above conclusion, it was observed :

(2.) While impugning the order, Annexure P-3, the contentions of Shri Jagan Nath Kaushal, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner are three- fold. The learned counsel firstly argued that no notice or opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner by the Secretary of the Board before cancelling the order/resolution, Annexure P-2; secondly, the Secretary of the Board who passed order Annexure P-3 cancelling the order/resolution Annexure P-2 of the Market Committee, was not competent to pass such an order in terms of Section 33(4)(i) of the Act; and thirdly, the finding of fact as recorded by the Administrator had not been set aside by the Secretary of the Board while cancelling the order resolution, Annexure P-2.

(3.) After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that this petition deserves to succeed. Section 42 of the Act provides that the Government shall have the power of reversing or modifying any order of the Board or any of its of passed or purporting to have been passed under this Act, if it considers it to be not in accordance with this Act, or the rules or bye-laws framed thereunder. In order to deal with the preliminary objection, it is necessary to notice the provisions of Section 33(4) of the Act which read thus :