(1.) RESPONDENT No. 1 Smt. Pista Devi is the owner of the premises in dispute. She rented out the same to M/s. Karam Chand Chuni Lal etc. the petitioner on an yearly rent of Rs. 192/- per annum. It appears that the tenant M/s. Karam Chand Chuni Lal sublet the premises to respondent No. 2 M/s. Sat Parkash Sanjeev Kumar, Commission Agents. The aforesaid Commission agents started using these premises as their godown and accordingly stocked their goods in it. These goods were pledged by respondent No. 2 with the Punjab National Bank, Kaithal and as per the procedure of the Bank for securing pledged goods, the Bank put its own lock on the premises in dispute. Pista Devi accordingly filed an application for ejectment of the tenant under Section 13 (2) (ii) (a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and also made the Bank a co-respondent. The tenant M/s. Karam Chand Chuni Lal, admitted the tenancy but denied the creation of a sub-tenancy in favour of respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2, too denied the allegation that it had ever taken over the lease rights of the property in question. Respondent No. 3, the Punjab National Bank also denied having taken possession but stated that the goods lying in the premises belonged to respondent No. 2 though they had been pledged with the Bank and as such the Bank had put its lock on the premises in dispute. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed: 1. Whether the respondents are liable to ejectment as alleged?, OPA 2. Relief.
(2.) THE Rent Controller found that M/s. Karam Chand Chuni Lal i. e. the petitioner, had not parted with the legal possession of the premises in dispute, to respondent No. 2 and accordingly dismissed the ejectment application. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller, an appeal was taken to the appellate authority who allowed the appeal holding that from the facts of the case it was apparent that the petitioner had handed over the possession to respondent No. 2 and as a matter of fact, this respondent had handed over possession to respondent No. 3, as the very fact that it had put its lock on the premises in dispute showed that it was this party that was in possession of the demised premises. The appeal was therefore, allowed vide order dated 4th September, 1980. Aggrieved thereby, the tenants i. e. M/s. Karam Chand Chuni Lal have come up in revision. This petition was originally filed by Mr. D. V. Sehgal a Senior Advocate of this Court, who was thereafter elevated to the Bench. This case came up for hearing on 31st March, 1992, when Mr. P. S. Rana, who had appeared with Mr. D. V. Sehgal as a junior counsel, sought time to seek instructions from his clients. The case was adjourned to 7th May, 1992. Today, however, the counsel for the petitioner is not present and I have heard the arguments of Mrs. Alka Sarin, learned counsel for respondent-Pista Devi.
(3.) MRS. Sarin has drawn my attention to the findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority. She has pointed out that as per the written statement filed, there was no case set out by either of the respondents in the ejectment application that the right created in favour of respondent No. 2 was in the nature of a licence She has further stated that after the filing of the written statement, an application for amendment of the same was moved so as to incorporate the plea of licence but this application was disallowed and no further steps were taken by the applicant to challenge the said order. It has been further argued that in the evidence of R. W. I Jugal Kishore who was one of the partners of the firm-respondent No. 2, an effort was admittedly made to lead evidence to show the creation of a licence in favour of the said respondent but as there were no pleading on this question, the evidence of Jugal Kishore could not be looked into. I find force in the argument of the learned counsel. The findings of the fact that have been recorded by the appellate authority that exclusive possession of respondent No. 2 on the premises in dispute stood proved, is in my view, based on cogent evidence. The very fact that the Punjab National Bank had put its own lock on the premises to secure the pledged goods, clearly indicated that the possession of the premises had been handed over to respondent No. 2 whose goods were lying therein. Moreover, I find that the plea of licence was never taken at the initial stage and the amendment of the written statement sought by way of an application was also dismissed. The attempt to create a licence was clearly an afterthought in order to defeat the case of respondent No. 1 Smt. Pista Devi.