NAND LAL Vs. MAC MILLAN PHARMACEUTICALS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is landlord's petition against the order of the District Judge, Amritsar, whereby order of the trial Court was modified and in consequence thereof, application filed by the landlord (petitioner herein) for grant of ad-interim injunction was partly allowed.

(2.) IN brief, the facts are that the landlord filed a suit for grant of permanent injunction, restraining the respondents-tenants to raise construction of any nature over the passage and the lawn and on the first floor rented out to the respondents. At the time of letting out of the premises, the respondents executed a rent-note dated 28. 4. 1986 in favour of the petitioner, incorporating all terms and conditions of the tenancy. According to clause-7 of the rent-note, it was specifically agreed that the respondents shall have no right to raise any construction over the open passage and lawn. The right of reconstruction of three rooms rented out to the respondents was given, but they were not given the right to construct rooms over these three rooms and also, any other construction in the main buildings. Along with the suit, an application for ad-interim injunction was also filed, which on contest, was allowed by the trial Court and respondents were restrained from raising any construction on any ground whatsoever and also over the first floor of the building till the disposal of the suit. On appeal filed by the tenant, the District Judge on finding that permission for reconstruction was given under the rent-note and interest of the landlord stands sufficiently protected by the terms and conditions incorporated in clause-7 of the rent-note, vacated the order of the trial Court, so far it had restrained the tenants from making construction on the first floor. However, order in regard to lawn and passage was maintained. The landlord has now impugned the said order in the present revision petition.

(3.) THE only contest between the parties is with regard to interpretation of clause-7 of the rent-note. Clause-7 of the rent-note is in two parts. The first part states that on three temporary stores already in existence, a right was given to the tenants to raise construction. The construction could be temporary or pucca. If the tenant makes temporary construction, then at the time of leaving the premises, he was given the right to remove the Malwa, but if pucca construction was made, then the tenant was to hand over the pucca construction without claiming any compensation. The other part of clause-7 states that on the top floor of the main building, there is one Barsati floor, i. e. where Barsati exists, on which the tenants had already raised certain construction including the walls and rooms, but construction was not complete at the time of execution of rent-note. Under the rent-note, the tenants were allowed to complete construction, but they were not permitted to raise any further construction on the floor or roof the that building. The construction made on the Barsati floor as well as on the site of the stores, if pucca, was to go to the landlord without any compensation to the tenants. It was also made clear that such building constructed by the tenants or additional construction made, shall be treated to be ownership of the landlord. From the reading of Clause-7 of the rent-note, the learned District Judge opined that the tenants were given permission to raise construction on the open space in the rented premises apart from the lawn and the passage. However, I am afraid to accept the interpretation so made by the District Judge. As already noticed, what was permitted to the tenants was the construction over the site of the stores and the construction which had already been made by the tenants on the Barsati floor. No further construction was allowed to be raised. The pucca construction made on the site of the stores and also the additional construction already made on the Barsati floor was to go to the landlord without any compensation to the tenants. It was for that matter, it was made clear in clause-7 of the rent-note that these constructions shall be treated to be the sole ownership of the landlord. Thus, the order of the District Judge requires a little modification. The contention of Mr. Kapoor, counsel for the respondents, that suit by the landlord is not maintainable because he has an alter native remedy of filing a petition for ejectment of the tenants, cannot be accepted for the reason that it is not a case of alter native remedy, but is a case of additional remedy. The landlord is not only entitled to restrain the tenants from changing the nature of the property, but is also entitled to seek their ejectment if the ground of material alternation or addition is avail able to the landlord under the Rent Act.