AMAR SINGH Vs. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY a preliminary notification dated October 11, 1991 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended upto date the hereinafter called 'the Act') land measuring 213. 65 acres was sought to be acquired in village Jhumbru and by a similar notification dated October 15, 1991 issued under Section 4 of the Act another area of 83 acres in Village Burail was required for a public purpose, namely, the Development of third phase of Chandigarh, city by the Chandigarh Administration, Chandigarh. The land covered by the two notifications included the land of the petitioners who belong to these two villages which fall in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. Details of the land required for the said public purpose are mentioned in the notifications. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made by a notification dated January 13, 1992 in regard to the land in village Burail and a similar declaration was also made in regard to the land in the other village. The Collector, Chandigarh was directed to take further action for the acquisition of the lands mentioned in the two notifications. These acquisition proceedings have been impugned by the petitioners in the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) THE notifications under Section 4 of the Act have been challenged primarily on the ground that the respondents have not complied with the mandatory provisions of Section 4 of the Act inasmuch as the notifications had not been published in two daily news papers circulating in the locality nor was public notice of the substances of the notifications given at convenient places in the locality. For this reason, according to the petitioners, they could not file their objections under Section 5a of the Act. Averments in this regard have been made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the petition but these have been denied and the corresponding reply of the respondents is in paragraph 6 of the written statement which reads as under :" in reply to para 6 of the writ petition, it is submitted that the impugned notification was published in the official gazette. The substance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is denied that the provisions of the Act were not complied with. The substance of the notification in respect of Burail was published in the Tribune and 'jan Satta' on 27. 10. 1991 and in respect of Jhumbru, the substance of Section 4 notification was published in the Tribune' dated 24. 10. 1991 and in Tanjabi Tribune and Jan Satta' on 20. 10. 1991. The substance of the notification was also given wide publicity in the locality and a report thereto was entered in the Roznamcha in respect of the Munadi conducted in Burail as well as Jhumbru villages. The substance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act pertaining to acquisition of land for villages Burail and Jhumbru was given wide publicity in the respective locality by way of conduct of Munadi in the area of the two villages and the revenue record/rapat Roznamcha with respect thereto is in possession of the Answering respondents and can be produced in Court as and when directed. " The original records were produced in Court and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents pointed out that the notifications had been published in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality one of which was in Hindi and another in Panjabi. In addition, the notifications were published in the daily Tribune as well. Learned counsel also pointed out that public notice of the. substance of the notifications under Section 4 of the Act was given at convenient places in the locality by beat of drum and an entry to this effect had been made in the daily diary maintained for the purpose. In view of the categoric stand taken by the respondents and fully supported by the record, I find no substance in the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. Ghansham Dass Goyal v. State of Haryana and Anr. , 1 1982 PLJ 146 and Jati v. State of Haryana and Ors. , 2 1986 (1) LLR 537 do not support the case of the petitioners inasmuch as in these cases Court found as a fact that the substance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act had not been published in the locality and, therefore, mandatory provisions of the Act stood violated and consequently, acquisition proceedings were held to be illegal. ln Jati's case (supra) learned Judge found that the report in the daily diary was vague and its contents did not make it dear as to what was announced by the chowkidar who was stated to have made the proclamation. In the present case the notifications have been published in the newspapers as required by Section 4 of the Act and public notice of the substance of the notifications has also been given at convenient places in the locality as per the report in the daily diary and it has not been averred in the petition that the said report is in any respect vague. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the two villages in which the acquired land is situate are not small villages or that their population is very large and spread over a big area so as to make it incumbent upon the respondents to give detailed particulars in regard to the places where the Munadi was done. It may be men turned that if the two villages are small and compact not spread over a large area and have small population, it would be enough for the respondents to state in the report that Munadi was done in the locality where the land is sought to be acquired. However, if the villages are big enough with large population, the requirement in the report may be different. These are all facts in regard to which the petitioners ought to have made specific averments so that the respondents could have given detailed reply. In the absence of necessary averments, it cannot be held that the acquisition proceedings are invalid, particularly when most of the other land-owners whose land has also been acquired through the same notifications filed their objections under Section 5a of the Act and have not challenged the acquisition proceedings. This contention of the petitioners has, thus, no merit and must be repelled.

(3.) IT was next urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that the purpose for which the land has been acquired is not a 'public purpose' within the meaning of the Act and that it is vague as a result whereof the petitioners were handicapped in filing their objections under Section 5a of the Act Reliance was sought to be placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohammed Shaft and Ors. , JT 1992 (3) S. C. 523, Munshi Singh and Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 S. C. 1150 and Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. governor, Delhi, AIR 1974 S. C 2077. A bare look at the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, as also the declarations under Section 6 makes it dear that the purpose for the land in question is sought to be acquired is 'development of 3rd phase of Chandigarh City by the Chandigarh Admimstration Chandigarh. This purpose to my mind is clearly a public purpose as defined in Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act, the relevant clauses of which read as under :