LAWS(P&H)-1993-7-141

BAKSHISH SINGH Vs. SUKHWINDER SINGH

Decided On July 22, 1993
BAKSHISH SINGH Appellant
V/S
SUKHWINDER SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is plaintiffs revision petition directed against the orders passed by Courts below declining the prayer for ad-interim injunction.

(2.) Facts, in brief, are that the petitioner is in possession of 25 kanals 6 marlas of land. According to him, he is a tenant of Gram Panchayat who is the owner of the land. Petitioner filed a suit against respondents No. 1 to 4, restraining them from dispossession him except in due course of law. Defendants on appearance made a statement that the petitioner would not be dispossessed except in due course of law and on the basis of this statement, the suit was decided on 21st April, 1990. The suit which forms the subject- matter of the present revision petition was filed subsequent to the decision of the earlier suit. In the present suit, again a prayer has been made for restraining defendants No. 1 to 4 from dispossessing the petitioner except in due course of law. Defendants are contesting the suit on the ground that in pursuance of the order of the Consolidation Authorities, they have come into possession of the land. The trial Court dismissed the application for grant of ad-interim injunction. On appeal, order of the trial Court was affirmed. The orders of the Courts below are now being impugned in the present revision petition.

(3.) After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this revision petition deserves to succeed. Admittedly, the petitioner was in possession and for that matter, a statement was made in the earlier suit that he would not be dispossessed except in due course of law. It has also come on record that relating to the land, a dispute is going on between the Gram Panchayat and the proprietors of the village. The Gram Panchayat is claiming to be its owner, whereas the proprietors of the village are disputing the claim of the Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat filed a writ petition in this Court claiming itself to be the owner of the land. The said writ petition was dismissed with the finding that proprietors of the village are the owners. The Gram Panchayat challenged this order before the Supreme Court by way of Special leave Petition, which is stated to be pending. As an interim measure, the Supreme Court has stayed the operation of the order of the High Court, meaning thereby that the Panchayat has been allowed to manage the land. Ad- interim injunction was refused to the plaintiff primarily on the ground that defendants No. 1 to 4 came into possession in pursuance of order dated 1st June, 1990 passed by the Consolidation Authorities under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. The possession pursuant to this order is alleged to have been delivered to them by the Consolidation Kanungo. Compared to this report, there is a Jamabandi for the year 1989-90, 1984-85 and Khasra Girdawari right upto Kharif 1991 in which possession is shown to be Gair Marusi. In the Jamabandi for the year 1989-90, copy of which was given to the petitioner on 20th November, 1992, a note is recorded that order of the Consolidation Authorities has yet not been implemented and the possession is of the tenants. Revenue record does not indicate that the defendants ever came into possession pursuant to the order passed under Section 42 of the Act. Status of the petitioner was of a tenant and he would continue to be a tenant until and unless he is ejected by an order of a Competent Court. The Consolidation Authorities could only partition the land but in no way, can change the status of the petitioner. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the orders of the Courts below cannot be sustained. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the respondents contended that this Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the discretion exercised by the trial Court. It is true that the revisional Court is always slow in interfering with discretionary orders passed by the Subordinate Court, but where Subordinate Court decides the case without considering the material placed before it or in disregard of the facts, the High Court can certainly interfere in revision. As already noticed, the revenue record clearly indicates that the petitioner was never dispossessed in pursuance of orders passed by the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, under Section 42 of the Act. Thus, a case is clearly made out for interference by this Court. Consequently, the revision petition is allowed, orders of the Courts below are set aside and the defendants are restrained from dispossessing the petitioner during pendency of the suit except in accordance with law. No costs. The trial Court shall make an endeavour to decide the suit expeditiously.