KEWAL KRISHAN CHOPRA Vs. PIARA LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner-landlord filed this petition for the ejectment of the respondent-tenant from the premises in dispute on several grounds but the only one which survives from this revision petition is as to whether the demised premises are unfit and unsafe for human habitation. According to the finding recorded by the appellate authority, a well and the roof of one room in occupation of the tenant has fallen down. The roof of another room on the first floor has also fallen down but that room though part of the building in dispute was not on lease with the tenant. The claim of the landlord was rejected on the ground that the remaining portion in occupation of the tenant was quite fit for human habitation & his ejectment could not be ordered simply because a wall and the roof of one room had fallen down which could be set right by ordinary repairs. The view of the appellate authority, however, cannot be sustained in view of a recent decision of this Court in Balbir Singh v. Hari Ram, 1983 AIR(P&H) 132 wherein it was held that once the building becomes unsafe or unfit for human habitation, a right is conferred on the landlord for eviction of the tenant and that right cannot be defeated by the tenant on his own, or by his seeking an order under Section 12 of The East Punjab Urban Restriction Act 1949 even if landlord has not come earlier to the Court seeking eviction under section 13. A similar view was taken by me in Chander Mohni v. Jeewa Singh,1982 2 RCJ 523 and it was held that the moment the roof of one of the rooms had been pulled down by the tenant for its replacement, a right accrued to the landlord to eject him and by its replacement, the tenant could not take away that right. Recently in another D.B. judgment in Sardarni Sampran Kaur and another v. Sant Singh a another, 1982 2 RCR(Rent) 413 it has been held that if the substantial part of the integrated larger building has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation the tenant can be ejected from the demised premises forming part thereof, under section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act despite the fact that the particular portion in his occupation may not be so. The view taken by the appellate authority on the proved facts, therefore, cannot be sustained in law and is hereby reversed.