PROVIDENT FUND INSPECTOR Vs. HARJINDER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE accused-respondents being the Director Incharge of a Private Limited Company and the Company itself, were convicted under section 14(1)(A) of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, (for short the Act) Shri P.K. Garg, Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, the trial Judge, did not impose on the accused the minimum sentence required under the law. He sentenced the accused to pay the fine of Rs. 1000/-, out of which he ordered a sum of Rs. 800/- to be paid to the complainant.

(2.) AGGRIEVED against the said order the Provident Fund Inspector, Ludhiana, has filed this revision petition complaining that the Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding a lesser sentence. There is no dispute at the bar that on account of the fault committed by the accused-respondents penalty under section 14 (1-A)(b) of the Act is attracted which prescribes that the term of imprisonment for the offence shall not be less than one month. The trial Judge made use of the proviso there to which is in the following terms : Provided that the Court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a lesser term or of fine only in lieu of imprisonment.

(3.) SHRI C.D. Dewan, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance on Meet Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 C.L.J. (Criminal) 126, a decision rendered by the Supreme Court to contend that "special reasons" in the context of the aforequoted proviso could only mean special to the accused-respondents in the case on whom sentence had been imposed by the trial Magistrate, who had exceeded his jurisdiction by indulging in general tries, and applying them to the accused. Meet Singh's case (supra) arose in special Leave from an appellate order of this Court and in the context of the prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. In that statute an analogous proviso is there in section 5 permitting the Court to impose the sentence of imprisonment less that one year for any special reasons recorded in writing. It is in that context that the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "The words 'special reasons' in the context in which they are used could only mean special to the accused on whom sentence is being imposed. The court has to weigh reasons advanced in respect of each individual accused whose case is taken up for awarding sentence. The word 'special' has to be understood in contradistinction to word 'general' or 'ordinary'. Now what does term 'special' connote ? "Special" means distinguished by some unusual quality; out of the ordinary ........... Thus anything which is common to a large class governed by the same statute cannot be said to be special to each of them. It would thus unquestionably appear that "special reasons" in the context of sentencing process must be special to the accused in the case or special to the facts and circumstances of the case in which the sentence is being awarded." (emphasis supplied by me). The decision of Jagdish Prasad v. West Bengal, (1972) 2 S.C.R., was noticed in Meet Singh's case (supra). That was a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Section 16 of the Act bears an analogous proviso permitting the Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which is not less than a particular period and a fine which is not less than a particular amount and for any "adequate and special reasons" mentioned in the judgment. The Court in that context said;