MANJIT SINGH Vs. DARSHAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE true termini for the determination of the limitation prescribed by Section 20 for proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is the significant and somewhat intricate question necessitating this reference to the Pull Bench.

(2.) THE five petitioners had preferred an application under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter called 'the Act') before the Advocate General, Punjab on Feb. 27, 1981 for securing his consent in order to institute an action of criminal contempt against the three respondents-police officials. The alleged contempt inter alia was said to be committed by the filing of false affidavits by the three respondents on Dec 17, 1980 in an earlier habeas corpus matter in Criminal Writ No. 163 of 1980, (Manjit Singh v. Darshan Singh, D. S. P.) decided on January 19, 1981. However, it was not till July 2, 1982 that the learned Advocate General, Punjab accorded his consent to the filing of a contempt petition against the respondents. After securing a copy of the said order, the present petition for contempt was instituted in this Court on July 21, 1982. When the matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench, an objection was surprisingly raised by the Assistant Advocate: General, Punjab himself that the contempt petition was barred by time having been instituted in Court beyond a period of one year from the date of the filing of the false affidavits on Dec. 17, 1980 and was, therefore, hit by Section 20 of the Act. Primary reliance for this objection was placed on two Division Bench judgments in Hari Nandan Agrawal v. S. N. Pandita and Gulab Singh v. The Principal, Sri Ramji Das. Expressing some disagreement with the view in the said authorities and also because of the significance of the question, the matter was referred for a decision by the larger Bench.

(3.) HEREIN particularly the answers to the questions arising for determination must turn on the peculiar and somewhat imprecise language of Section 20 of the Act which is in the following terms:- Limitation for actions for contempt-No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. It is axiomatic and indeed was not seriously disputed before us that the limitation prescreened in Section 20 of the Act is applicable both in the field of civil as also of criminal contempt However, we are primarily concerned with the issue of criminal contempt. Now barring the somewhat unusual case of contempt in facie curiam expressly provided for in Section 14 of the Act, the succeeding Section 15 introduces certain pre-requisites for the cognizance of criminal contempt. An analysis of this section would indicate that such contempt may be taken cognizance of: