SANT SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner impugns the award of the Tribunal constituted under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (for short, the Act), on the grounds:

(2.) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length I, however, find that the petition deserves to be dismissed.

(3.) No doubt, it is true in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the final court in State of Kerala v. P. P. Hassan Koya, AIR 1968 SC 1201 that in determining compensation payable in respect of land with buildings, compensation cannot be determined by assessing the value of the land and the break-up value of the building separately. Though it is more so in the case of buildings used for business purposes yet even in the case of. residential buildings what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to receive from a willing purchaser generally depends upon a variety of circumstances including the nature of construction, its age, situation, other amenities available, its special advantages and a host of other. circumstances. But in the instant case even if this stand of the learned counsel is accepted and the impugned award is set aside on that account still: to my mind he cannot take any benefit out of that. As a matter of fact, the only evidence he has led before the Tribunal in support of .his claim for compensation: of the building in question is the statement of one Mehar Singh AW 24, Retired Engineer, who has again evaluated this building on the basis of the same method, i. e., assessing the market value of the land underneath the building and the cost of the superstructure separately. It is the conceded position that no other evidence has been led by the petitioner in that regard. So if the method adopted by the Tribunal has to be disapproved and the impugned award is to be set aside on that account, the petitioner's own evidence has also to be discarded on that very score. Mere setting aside of the award by this Court cannot possibly entitle the petitioner to lead any fresh or more evidence before the Tribunal. Undisputably, the proceedings before the Tribunal under the Land Acquisition Act are in the nature of civil proceedings in a civil court and the petitioner- claimant has the status of a Plaintiff. The onus of the issue as to what was the market value of the property in question was concededly on the petitioner and he had led no other evidence except examining Mehar Singh AW 24. Thus, I am satisfied that in case the impugned award has to be set aside and the case has to be sent back that is the maximum the petitioner can claim if his above-noted argument is accepted--it will be an exercise in futility as merely on account of the setting aside of this award the petitioner would not be in a position to lead any further evidence in the case.