GRAM SABHA OF VILLAGE CHHAJALWADI Vs. BHAJAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, dated July 31, 1975, setting aside the decision of the trial court.

(2.) The plaintiff-respondent Bhajan Singh brought the instant suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant-appellant Gram Sabha of Village Chhajjalwadi from dispossessing him by force from the land in dispute on the plea that he is occupying this land as a statutory tenant and he cannot be evicted therefrom otherwise than in due course of law. The Gram Sabha pleaded that the lease in favour of the plaintiff has expired by efflux of time and, therefore, he has no right to retain the possession and is consequently estopped from suing. The learned trial Court accepted the plea of the Gram Sabha and held that the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit and is, therefore, not entitled to the injunction prayed for. On arriving at these findings the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The lower appellate court, however, reversed these findings and found that the principle of estoppel is not applicable to this case. It was held that though the land in dispute does not vest in the Gram Sabha but the latter is authorised to manage the same and to derive its benefits from its income and further that despite the fact that the period of lease in favour of the plaintiff having expired, the Gram Sabha cannot evict him forcibly and must do so in due course of law. On these findings the plaintiff's appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial court were set aside and a decree for permanent injunction was granted in plaintiff's favour restraining the Gram Sabha from evicting him otherwise than in due course of law.

(3.) No meaningful criticism was levelled by the learned counsel for the appellant against the findings of the lower appellate court. Manifestly, a tenant cannot be physically removed from the land by force after the period of his lease expires and he can be ejected only in due course of law. It is also plain that the principle of estoppel embodied in section 115 of the Evidence Act has no application to the instant case. Section 115 of the Evidence Act envisages application of estoppel in cases where a person, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief. In such a case neither he nor his representative, by applying the principle of estoppel, can be allowed to deny the truth of that thing. No such circumstances exist in the present case estopping the plaintiff from filing the suit for injunction.