RAMTI DEVI Vs. SAT PARKASH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS judgment will dispose of three Civil Revision Nos. 1447, 1448 and 1449 of 1981 as all on them are between the same parties and involve common questions of law and fact.

(2.) SMT . Ramti Devi, the land-lady, filed a petition in the year 1975 for ejectment of the respondent from the house in dispute on the grounds that Sat Parkash tenant has not paid the rent since October 1, 1974; that he is using the demised premises for commercial purpose; that she requires the said premises for her own occupation and that its value and utility has been impaired by the tenant. She filed two other petitions in the year 1977 and 1978 mainly on the ground of non-payment of rent but all other grounds taken in the earlier petition were also reiterated. Respondent No. 1 only contested the petition, tendered the arrears of rent and controverted the other allegations. He further pleaded that the building in dispute was let out for purpose of business and in the alternative alleged that it was a scheduled building where he was practising as Vaid since the last fifteen years. After trial, the Rent Controller found that the predecessor-in-interest of the present landlady had moved a petition for ejectment of the tenant on the ground that the demised premises had been let out for residential purposes but were being used for extracting juices and manufacture of syrups. This plea of the landlord was upheld and the ejectment order passed. However, at the stage of appeal, the landlord gave up his rights under the ejectment order passed by accepting an increase in the rent from Rs. 25/- to Rs. 35/- per month. On these facts, it was held that the landlord was not entitled to maintain a second petition to seek ejectment on the ground of perversion of use of the demised premises. As regards the plea of personal need it was held that as the tenant was pursuing his profession as a Vaid as well as residing there, it was a schedule building as defined in section 2(h) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the Act) and as such ejectment of tenant on the ground of personal necessity could not be claimed. The petition was consequently dismissed. Its finding having been affirmed on appeal, the landlady has come in revision.

(3.) IN support of second ground of personal necessity, the learned counsel urged that the same has been erroneously rejected taking the building in dispute to be schedule building. It appears that neither the authorities below nor the learned counsel for the parties were aware of the fact that under the Haryana Act the buildings are classified in two categories, residential and non-residential. It was only under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act that the buildings in which certain professions were carried on by the tenant were classified as schedule buildings. The contention of the learned counsel, therefore, is well-merited that the authorities below have illegally rejected the claim of personal necessity taking the demised premises as a schedule building. However, it is not necessary to remand the case on that score because the plea of personal necessity is liable to be rejected on this ground as well.