KALWATI Vs. ASA RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a revision petition filed by a wife who has a maintenance order in her favour, but has remained unsuccessful in executing it in entirety.

(2.) THE undisputed facts are these : -

(3.) A perusal of her order of the learned Sub -Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Hansi, dated 6.3.1981 goes to show that the application filed by the wife bore a prayer that the property given in the list be attached by a warrant, because the respondent had failed to make the payment of maintenance allowance amounting to Rs. 5,250. As is plain therefrom these steps were suggestive of the provisions of section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, presumably those of clause (a) of sub -section (1) thereof. The Legislature in its wisdom has however chosen that the drastic action for issuance of warrant under sub -section (3) of Section 125 read with section 421 of the Code should remain limitation bound. All the same other processes known to law have not been cast aside for the maintained wife to avail of. Surely on the non -availability of the right to recover the sum as if it was a fine levied, is not the end of order of maintenance. It only means that there is no urgent or stringent measure to be taken to come to the aid of the wife. The execution of the order in her favour at the pain of attachment and sale of moveable property of the husband, or recovery through the agency of the Collector as arrears of land revenue from his moveable or immovable property, or in given circumstances by putting him in prison under sub -section (3) of section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code are exceptional coercive steps, and for these as in the instant cse, the wife who had sought to execute the maintenance orders by attachment of the properties of her husband had obviously to satisfy the court, that her claim was within limitation, on which she obviously failed. The precedent cited on her behalf Deviden Chenaji v. Mankibai Devideen, 1966 Crl. L.J. 1089, can have no applicability to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as no parallel proceedings were pending on 7.11.1977, when the first application was made and equally so was the case on 5.9.1980, when the second application was made.