SHAMSHER SINGH Vs. JAGIR SINGH AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is plaintiffs second appeal whose suit for possession by way of redemption of the agricultural land has been dismissed both the Courts below.

(2.) THE plaintiff filed the suit for possession by way of redemption of agricultural land measuring 122 bighas and 6 biswas on the allegations that he was the owner of the suit land which was mortgaged with Prem Kaur, the widow of Bakhtawar Singh Originally the suit land was mortgaged with Tara Singh, the father of the husband of Prem Kaur on 9th Maghar 966 Bk. for Rs. 490/ -. Then Singh Ram and Gurdial Kaur had mortgaged the land, in dispute for Rs. 5,000/ - with the plaintiff through the registered mortgage deed date. December 9, 1968. The plaintiff claimed possession of the land by redemption from Prem Kaur. It was also pleaded that Bakhtawar Singh, the husband of Prem Kaur bad instituted a suit against Singh Ram and Gurdial Kaur seeking a declaration to the effect that he had become the owner of the land by adverse possession. Bakhtawar Singh died during the pendency of that suit and Prem Kaur, his wife, continued the suit as his legal representative. The same was dismissed on October 15, 1962. On appeal it was decreed by the Additional District Judge on May 27, 1963 However, Singh Ram and Gurdial Kaur went in appeal to the High Court which was accepted on December 7, 1966, and it was held that Prem Kaur was in possession of the land as a mortgagee for Rs. 490/and was not its owner. That judgment was claimed to operate as res judicata between the parties. In paragraph 9 of the plaint it was also pleaded that the suit was within limitation from the date of the mortgage, i.e. 9th Maghar, 966 Bk. In addition, it was also claimed that Bakhtawar Singh, the husband of Prem Kaur acknowledged the mortgage on 12th Phagun, 1994, Bk. when he mortgaged his mortgagee rights with Pritam Singh son of Kishan Singh; Amrik Singh and Ajmer Singh, sons of Nagina Singh. Bakhtawar Singh had also acknowledged the mortgage in 1954 when he had made an application for the redemption of the mortgage made by him in favour of Pritam Singh and others. Thus, the suit was claimed to be within time from the dates of these acknowledgements of the mortgage. The suit was contested inter alia on the ground that it was barred by time. According to the defendants, the date of the mortgage of the land was Harh Shudi Panchmi, 1961 Bk. and not 9th Maghar, 1966 Bk. as alleged in the plaint. Kanhiya and his sister had not taken steps for the redemption of the mortgage within the prescribed period of limitation and as such, their rights of redemption had been lost by lapse of time It was denied that Bakhtawar Singh had ever acknowledged the mortgage, as alleged. The trial Court while discussing the question of limitation came to the concision that the suit was brought long after the date of the mortgage and hence was barred by time According to the finding of the trial Court, the period of 60 years expired on Harh Shudi Panchmi, 2021 Bk. (about 1964 A.D.) whereas the present suit was filed on December 28, 1968 Thus, the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. In appeal, the learned Additional District Judge affirmed these findings of the trial Court and, thus, maintained the decree dismissing the plaintiff's suit Dissatisfied with the same, he has come up in second appeal to this Court.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the defendants have been making acknowledgements with respect of the mortgage, in dispute, and, therefore, form the dates of those acknowledgements, the suit was within limitation After going through the relevant evidence on the record in this behalf, I do not find any merit in this contention as well. The lower appellate Court has discussed the entire evidence on this issue and has given a firm finding that on the basis of the alleged admissions, the plaintiff could not claim his suit to be within limitation. The learned counsel for the appellant was unable to point out any infirmity or illegality in the said finding of the lower appellate Court as to be interfered with in second appeal.