KULWANT SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY the impugned order Annexure P.1, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Samana, initiated proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also passed order under section 146(1) of Code attaching the land in question and appointing S.H.O. Police Station, Samana, as receiver. The revision petition filed by Kulwant Singh and others was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala. Feeling aggrieved, the present petition under section 482 of the Code has been preferred.

(2.) THE salient facts are that Radha Kishan of the first party entered into agreement to sell the land in question to Kulwant Singh and others (second party). It was said to be in the possession of Manak Chand and others (third party) who claimed to be tenants. As dispute arose between the three parties about the possession, the first party filed a suit for mandatory injunction in which the third party was not impleaded. Be that as it may, the suit was dismissed. The second party's suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell against the first party is pending. During the pendency thereof the Civil Court ordered that second party, who claims to be in possession, be not dispossessed. Again, in this suit the third party has not been impleaded. In the situation, the third party filed a suit for which is also pending. Therein, the Civil Court has ordered that status quo be maintained. Apprehending breach of the peace, the police reported the matter to the Sub-Division Magistrate, Samana who upon a consideration of the entire matter and the hearing the learned counsel for the three parties, passed the impugned order.

(3.) AS regards the next question during the pendency of the above-mentioned civil suits, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to invoke the provisions of section 145 of the Code, suffice it to say that the authorities including Mohinder Singh v. Shri Dilbagh Rai, 1976 PLR 803 (DB) were considered by the Magistrate in the impugned order and the objection was rightly overruled. All the same, learned counsel for the second party cited some other rulings of learned Single Judges. Suffice it to say here that these three rulings do not run counter to the well-settled view of this Court that pendency of a civil suit between the parties does not operate as a bar to the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, in the given facts of those cases, owning to the pendency of the suits and the orders passed by the Civil Courts, the learned Judges expressed the view that continuance of proceedings under section 145 of the Code was not called for. As none of these precedents has any bearing on the facts of the case in hand, I do not want to burden this judgment with these citations.