PURAN CHAND GUPTA Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MUNICIPAL Committee Ludhiana, was superseded by the Punjab State government on 5-10-1970 under the provisions of Section 238 of the Punjab municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). A notification to this effect was alleged to have been published in the official Gazette of the State government. The Municipal Commissioners of the said Municipal Committee who by the order of supersession went out of office, challenged the supersession of the committee in a writ petition filed in this Court on a number of grounds. Learned single Judge of this Court, vide his judgment dated 9-11-1971, accepted the writ petition and quashed the order of supersession. It is against this judgment of the learned Single Judge that the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by two ex members of the Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, namely Puran Chand Gupta and Parkash Chand Thapar, with the contention that the supersession of the committee was legal and the same should not have been interfered with by the learned Single Judge.

(2.) MR. H. S. Doabia, the learned counsel for the appellants, in support of the letters Patent Appeal, vehemently argued that the finding of the Learned Single judge, that the notification issued under Section 238 of the Act was incompetent as the said notification did not give reasons for the supersession of the Committee because the schedule mentioned in the body of the notification giving reasons for the suppression of the committee was not published along with the notification in the official Gazette, is liable to be set aside because according to the learned counsel it is not necessary that a notification under Section 238 of the Act should be published in the official Gazette. The learned counsel contends that there is no grievance made out by the writ petitioners in the writ petition that they were not informed of the order of supersession along with the grounds on which the committee was superseded and if all concerned were informed about the order of the State Government in the manner other than by publishing the notification in the official Gazette, the requirements of Section 238 of the Act are satisfied and, therefore, the said notification cannot be held to be incompetent. The learned counsel referred to the provisions of Sections 1 (3), 5 (1), 5 (2), 15, 62-A of the Act which provisions according to him, mention about the notification to be issued by the State Government in the official Gazette. The learned counsel also referred to the provisions of Sections 3 (7), 3 (8), 16, 120 and 238 of the Act, wherein according to him, the notification has to be issued by the State Government and it is not necessary that it should be issued in the official Gazette. Therefore, it is contended that even though the notification in question be deemed to have not been published in the official Gazette, even then the petitioners having not made out any grievance to the non-publication of the impugned notification with the schedule, the said notification cannot be quashed.

(3.) NO one appears to oppose this appeal and the learned counsel for the State also supported the appellants by saying that the order passed by the State government superseding the Municipal Committee, is with jurisdiction and the same had been wrongly quashed by the learned Single Judge.