(1.) This regular second appeal by the plaintiffs, who had filed the suit for permanent injunction in a representative capacity under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stands concluded by the concurrent finding of fact of the Courts below that the strip of land in dispute was not proved to be a lane or thoroughfare as alleged by the plaintiff-appellants.
(2.) The baras (walled enclosures) of the parties are situated on opposite sides of the strip of land in dispute. Both the Courts below had found, after a careful appraisal of the evidence examined by the parties, that there had been an earlier litigation between them or some of their family members and that the lane separating the two baras at the time of the earlier litigation had since been included by the appellants in their own bara and that the lane was sought to be shifted forward in the area which had comprised the bara of the defendant-respondents. Shri Aggarwal, the learned counsel for the appellants, has not given me any cogent grounds for entering into a third reappraisal of the evidence or for disturbing the concurrent finding of fact of the Courts below. Even otherwise a lane or public street would be a part of the gora deh or shamilat land of the village and would vest in the Gram Panchayat in view of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 . According to this Court's decision in Lal Chand v. Arya Pritinidbi Sabha and others, 1962 CurLJ 454, the locus standi to bring a suit for the removal of an encroachment on the lane or thoroughfare would vest in the Gram Panchayat and none else. The suit was, therefore, liable to be dismissed on this ground as well. The Sarpanch and other members of the Gram Panchayat had actually appeared as witnesses for the defendant-respondents to prove the falsity of the appellants' case.
(3.) The appeal fails and is dismissed. Shri Jain, the learned counsel for the respondents, does not press for an order as to the costs incurred by his clients in this Court.