(1.) This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed under the following circumstances :
(2.) As regards the first submission made by Shri Kuldip Singh, it has been admitted in the returns filed by the respondents, that the zones had been prepared by the Election Manager, respondent No. 7, but these had been duly approved by the outgoing Managing Committee in its meeting held on 22.12.1972, that is to say, a day before the polling of votes. The rejection of the nomination papers had, however, taken place on 18.12.1972 which was the date of scrutiny according to the election programme framed by the Election Manager under paragraph 4(1) of Appendix 'C' to the Punjab Co-operative Societies Rules. The Registrar, respondent No. 2, had duly accorded his approval to this programme and the petitioner filed his nomination papers according to the election programme without objecting, in any manner, to the delimitation of zones by respondent No. 7. The petitioner had filed his nomination papers as a representative of the Bhangala Primary Society and it would not have made any difference to him as to in which zone his Society may have fallen. The outgoing Managing Committee had accorded it's approval to the zones prepared by the Election Manager and no prejudice may appear to have been caused to the petitioner and it cannot be said that the results of the elections have in any manner been materially affected by this framing of zones by the Election Manager. The first submission made by Shri Kuldip Singh does not, therefore, appear to have any substance and the zones had been duly approved before the elections were held. The contention is, therefore, repelled.
(3.) As regards Shri Kuldip Singh's second contention, the fact is not seriously in dispute that the primary Society that the petitioner was representing in the elections was in default with the payment of its contributions towards the Education Fund. The correctness of the certificate issued by the Manager of the Hoshiarpur District Co-operative Union has not been challenged. Shri Kuldip Singh's argument was that the petitioner was not suffering from any personal disqualifications and the disqualification of the Society which he was representing should not have led to the rejection of his nomination papers. Shri Kuldip Singh could not cite any ruling in support of his argument. Shri Baldev Singh Khoji, counsel for the contesting respondent No. 17, has, however, been able to cite before me a Single Bench ruling of this Court in Parma Nand v. The State of Punjab etc, 1973 CurLJ 90, which may seem to demolish the contention raised by Shri Kuldip Singh. Reference could also be made in this connection to the Supreme Court ruling in Veerpal Singh v. Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Meerut and others, 1973 AIR(SC) 1052, where a bye-law under consideration had provided that if the Society which the petitioner represented was in default, the petitioner would also become ineligible. Rule 25 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Rules, enumerates the disqualifications for membership of the Committee. It lays down that no person shall be eligible for election as a member of the Committee if he is in default to any Co-operative Society in respect of any sum due from him to the Society or owes to any Co-operative Society an amount exceeding his maximum credit limit. The word 'person' as used in this Rule would include a registered Co-operative Society as has been held in S. Doraiswami Mudaliar v. Balasubramaniam and others, 1968 AIR(Mad) 94; Basant Kumar Mishra v. Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Jabalpur and others, 1971 Co-operative Law Journal 97; and Motipur Zamindari Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and another, 1953 AIR(SC) 320. The delegate or representative has no independent existence and he only represents the Society which is the real member of the Committee and if the Society suffers from a disqualification, its representative cannot be eligible for election. The Education Fund is payable to the Hoshiarpur District Co-operative Union which also is admittedly a Society. The use of the words 'he', 'his' and 'him' would not imply that a natural human being is alone, under contemplation and these words cannot apply to a Society who would be, a person within the contemplation of the statute. Shri Kuldip Singh wanted to draw some conclusions from the definitions of the words 'voter', 'representative, 'candidate' or the use of the word 'elector' in clauses (e), (f) and (g) of Appendix 'C' to the Rules, but he has not been able to support his conclusions by reference to any law or authority. I am, therefore, not impressed by Shri Kuldip Singh's argument that what we have to judge or take into consideration are the personal qualifications or disqualifications of the petitioner and not of the Society which he represents.