CHARAN SINGH Vs. GEHAL SINGH, ETC.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) CHARAN Singh has filed this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge of this Court, dated 14th May, 1973, by which R.S.A. 1102 of 1963, filed by Gehl Singh Respondent was allowed.

(2.) THE only legal point involved in this case is as to what effect the Punjab Custom (Power of Contest) Amendment Act, 1973 (Punjab Act No. 12 of 1973), (hereinafter referred to as the Act), has on the pending cases wherein the reversioners have challenged alienations under the Punjab Customary Law on the usual grounds that the property alienated was ancestral qua them and that the alienation was without consideration and necessity and the same would not affect their reversionary rights after the death of the alienor. The learned Single Judge, in a well -considered judgment, has held that the intention of the Legislature was clearly to give retrospective effect to the amendment made in Section 7 of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Punjab Act No. 2 of 1920), (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) by Section 3 of the Amending Act and these amendments would affect all pending proceedings.

(3.) THE case of Sharma on which reliance has been placed related to the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. That Act, as it originally stood, was due to expire on the 1st of April, 1951, but in that year an Amending Act was passed which, among other things, prolonged its life to the 1st of April, 1952. By still another Act passed in 1952, life of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was prolonged for a further period of six months, namely, till the 1st of October, 1952. The contention that was raised before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was that mere prolongation of the life of an Act did not, by reason of that alone, prolong the life of a detention which was due to expire when the Act under which it was made, expired. After setting out Section 3 of the Amending Act, which made provision about the validity and duration of detention in certain cases, their Lordships rejected the contention and made the observations reproduced above on which reliance was placed by Mr. Kaushal. By applying the law as enunciated by their Lordships, the result to follow would be that the Principal Act shall have to be. read by incorporating therein the amendment made by the Amending Act of 1973. So read, Section 6 will be omitted and Section 7 would be read by substituting the words "immovable property whether ancestral or non -ancestral" in place of the words "non -ancestral immovable property". No change has been effected in Section 4 which saved the alienations made prior to the coming into force of the Principal Act of 1920; rather in the Amending Act no specific provision for saving the pending proceeding has been made. If the Legislature had intended to save the alienations made prior to the date of the enforcement of the Amendment Act, then the provisions of Section 4 too would have been suitably amended. In our view, the words "this Act" in Section 4, mean the Act of 1920 and not the Amending Act of 1973 or the Act of 1920 as amended by Act of 1973. Moreover, we are holding that the Act is retrospective in operation and for that reason also this contention of the learned Counsel becomes untenable.