GURBAX SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE respondents were tried by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Amritsar, for offences under Sections 326, 325, 324, 148 and 149, Indian Penal Code, and convicted of these offences on June 18, 1971. In appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, observed that the first information report was lodged with undue delay -and that the prosecution witnesses failed to give a proper explanation of the injuries sustained by Mangal Singh respondent. On these grounds, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, gave the benefit of doubt to the respondents and allowed their appeal. Gurbax Singh and Surta Singh who were the injured witnesses have filed a revision petition against the acquittal of the respondents.

(2.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged that Gurbax Singh suffered 9 injuries and Surta Singh suffered four injuries in the course of this incident. Mangal Singh respondent who was arrayed as an accused person before the learned trial Magistrate suffered two contused wounds only which were some- how or other not explained by the prosecution witnesses. He has also urged that because the injured witnesses were unable to make a statement earlier, the delay in lodging the first information report should not have been considered as a material circumstance. It was submitted that these grounds were not sufficient to warrant a finding of acquittal. I am afraid, I cannot agree with this submission. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was the final Court of fact and the reasons given by him for disbelieving the prosecution story are not irrelevant. Because of the acquittal of the respondents, the presumption of innocence in their favour stands augmented. Such a finding cannot be interfered with in revision.

(3.) IT was then argued by the learned Counsel that the learned trial Magistrate had ordered that out of the fine, if realized, Rs. 300/- were to be given to Gurbax Singh and Rs. 200/- were to be given to Surta Singh petitioners. At the hearing of the appeal, no notice was given to the injured witnesses and that, since the respondents have been acquitted, the benefit accruing to the petitioners in the shape of compensation awarded to them has been denied to them without affording them a proper hearing. In support of this contention, he has relied upon Hiralal Bhagwanji v. Kantilal Rangildas (1971) 12 Guj LR 446; Emperor v. Chunilal Bhagwanji 201 Ind Cas 710 : 43 Cri LJ 765 (Bom); Balwant Ganesh v. Motilal Nathuram AIR 1936 Nag 144 : 38 Cri LJ 76; Bharasa Now v. Sukdeo AIR 1926 Cal 1054 : 27 Cri LJ 1086; and Sunil Kr. Ghosh v. Ajit Kr. Das 73 Cal WN 212 : 1969 Cri LJ 1234. It has been held in these cases that it would be proper to allow a complainant a hearing at the time of appeal; On this basis, it was urged that the acquittal of the respondents be set aside and the case be remitted to the learned trial Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. In my considered opinion, this contention raised by the learned Counsel is also without any force. In cognizable cases, it is the State which is the aggrieved party and the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide that a private complainant should be heard in appeal against out of the trial of such cases. A criminal Court while recording conviction of an accused has the discretion to grant compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, under Section 545 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but a private complainant has no right to insist that compensation must under all circumstances be awarded to him. When an accused files an appeal against his conviction, the entire case is re-opened in appeal. The effect of the judgment of acquittal passed by an appellate Court is that the conviction recorded by the trial Magistrate becomes non-existent in the eyes of law; in other words, when a conviction is set aside, the effect which flows out of such a conviction, namely, the award of compensation to a complainant, also disappears. When compensation is awarded to a complainant, it is always subject to the right of appeal which vests in the convict. This grant of compensation cannot be regarded as a vested right. Consequently, a complainant cannot complain that the principles of natural justice are violated when a convict is acquitted in appeal in cognizable cases. In Union of India v. J. N. Sinha 1970 Serv LR 748 : , it was observed by the Supreme Court as under: