AUTO PINS Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Judgment will dispose of Civil Writ numbers 249, 202, 237, 241, 250, 251, 252, 278, 351, 497 and 556 of 1973. They have been filed in similar circumstances and against similar notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

(2.) In this judgment, I am giving the relevant facts from Civil Writ No. 497 of 1973. The petitioner which is a registered firm under the Indian. Partnership Act, 1932 entered into an agreement with Kewal Kishan Aggarwal, Kamalkishan Aggarwal, Bankeykishan Aggarwal and Yogikishan Aggarwal for purchase of the factory building with the land bearing plot No. 59 comprised in khasra numbers 191, 195, 196 and 198, measuring 11 acres and 15 marlas (53 bighas 5 Biswas) for Rs. 8,00,000/-. In pursuance of the agreement, they executed two sale-deeds dated January 19, 1973, in its favour. The respondent No. 1 issued a notification dated March 24, 1971, published in the Haryana Government Gazette dated March 30, 1971, under Section 4 of the Act and notified therein that the Government needed part of land bearing Khasra Nos. 191, and Khasra Nos. 195, 196 and 198 and various other Khasra numbers at public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the planned development of Sector 19, Urban Estates, Faridabad, in Ballabgarh-Faridabad Controlled Area in Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Gurgaon. The vendors, namely, Kewalkishan Aggarwal etc, filed objections against the aforesaid notification under Section 4 of the Act. They believed that their objections had been rejected by the State Government as no hearing was given to them. On November 30, 1972, a notification was published in the Haryana Government Gazette of even date under Section 6 of the Act regarding the said land along with other land. The notification dated March 24, 1971, under section 4 (Annexure 'A') and November 30, 1972, under Section 6 (Annexure 'B'), are being challenged as illegal, void and ineffective. The main allegations in other writ petitions are the same, but they contain other allegations also, which I shall deal with separately. The State has contested the writ petitions and denied the allegations of the writ petitioners.

(3.) The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the notification dated March 24, 1971, under Section 4 of the Act is vague, uncertain and indefinite. He further submits that it does not contain the specific purpose for which the land was required by the State Government and, therefore, the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest could not effectively file objections under section 5-A of the Act. The learned counsel for the State has submitted that there was no vagueness in the notification and the petitioner knew the purpose for which the land was being acquired.