RICHHPAL Vs. SHIV LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is execution second appeal by Richhpal, judgment-debtor against Shiv Lal, decree-holder. The facts leading to the appeal are as under :-

(2.) On February 29, 1964, two compromise decrees, one for recovery of Rs. 1,854.55 and the other for recovery of Rs. 1,757.60 were passed by the trial Court. Certain amount is said to have been paid by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder. The major portion of the decretal amount, however, remained unpaid. The decree-holder last took out execution of these decrees on January 27, 1970 and got agricultural land belonging to the judgment-debtor attached. On attachment of land, the judgment-debtor entered objections under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code contending that the land had not been attached according to law, that the judgment-debtor had paid the decretal amounts by installments, that the applications for execution of the decrees were barred by time, that the rule of damdupat applied to the transaction under decree, that the decree-holder was a money-lender without licence, that the judgment-debtor was a debtor within the definition of the word 'debtor' given in sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 and that in any case it was a fit case for the payment of the decretal amounts being directed by instalments. The decree-holder repudiated these pleas and urged that they had no force and the objections put in on behalf of the judgment-debtor deserved dismissal. The following issues were framed by the Court executing the decree :-

(3.) The executing Court hearing these objections had to adjourn the case for as large a number of times as 17 at the instance of the judgment-debtor to enable him to lead evidence under the issues framed. In spite of indulgence shown by the Court and consequent adjournments secured to gain the end of postponing the day of payment of decretal amounts by those dilatory tactics, the judgment-debtor did not load any evidence either documentary or oral. This is a typical case, in which a litigating party seems to be having his way and say to secure the end of getting the case adjourned on one pretext or the other and yet never comes forward to carry into effect the purpose of production of evidence, for which he managed for the adjournments. The Court executing the decree should have shown reluctance and refused to adjourn decree should have shown reluctance and refused to adjourn the cases from date to date for a dozen and half times extending over a period of two years and a half months.