PUNJAB STATE Vs. GOPAL SINGH NAGAHIA SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condensation of the delay that occurred on the filling of an appeal in this Court. The appeal is against an award made by the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, THe award was made on the 30th April 1962 and the last date for the filing of the appeal was the 20 -9 -1962. The appeal by the State was, "however, filed in this Court on the 25th September 1962. A lengthy explanation is one red to justify the delay, it is said first that the details or the award had to be worked out and that took a long time and the details were not ready till the 19th September 1962 a statement which is extremely surprising but which is not very important because the appeal could in the circumstances have been filed on the 20th September, further explanation then is that on the 20th September 1962 a bill was prepared and sought to be drawn from the Treasury to cover the cost of the court -tee stamp but the Treasury reported that no proper sanction had been received till then and the bill could not be drawn. Thereupon it is sale that frantic steps were taken to obtain the necessary sanction through a special messenger and the money was drawn only on the 24th September 1962 but it was too late that day to file the appeal, and it was consequently tiled on the next day in substance, therefore, the explanation for the delay comes to this that on the last day for the tiling the Appellant suddenly discovered that the have the necessary money to buy the ring that the Appellant is the state or of explanation is again very surprising, that, it is clear that the non -availability or question was due to the negligence of the Appellant.

(2.) MR . Salooja on behalf of the State suggests that some special latitude should be shown to the Appellant because there is certain routine fixed in, the Departments of the Appellant's Government which routine has been responsible for the delay. The argument largely proceeds on the assumption that to obtain a benefit under Section 5 a of the Limitation Act all that is necessary is to state why delay occurred in the filing of the appeal and not that the Appellant is to satisfy the Court that there was good and sufficient cause for the delay. I am not persuaded that this is a correct approach to the question, for what Section 5 of the Limitation Act says is that an appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation provided we Appellant is in a position to satisfy the court that the Appellant had 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the appeal within time, and a mere statement of the reasons which led to the delay cannot by itself amount to such satisfaction, and, if we were to accept Mr. Salooja's argument, we would have to condone the delay in every case in which the cause of the delay, however insufficient by Itself, is revealed. In the present case, I take it that the delay occurred because on the last date of limitation the Appellant discovered that it had not sufficient money to buy the necessary Court -fee, but no explanation is forthcoming why such state of affairs was allowed to come into existence except, of course, sheer negligence in not providing for the necessary amount in good time. I am not persuaded that any special latitude is due to the, State Government in the matter of limitation, for the State is like any other litigant subject to the same disabilities in a Court of law as any other person. As I view the facts, it is hardly possible for, us to hold that the appeal was delayed for sufficient cause, and there is thus no justification to condone it would, therefore, dismiss the petition but leave the parties to their own costs.