UNION OF INDIA (UOI) Vs. GIRDHARI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE main facts of this case are not in dispute. On the 1st July, 1947 Messrs. Keshodas Hassanand of Karachi handed over to the railway authorities Karachi three cases containing looking glass to be despatched to Delhi Shahdara Railway Station. These goods appear to have been carried from Karachi as far as Mecleod Ganj Road Railway Station and at that place the goods were held up by the Pakistan Customs authorities, the partition of the country having in the meantime taken place. The railway receipts were later endorsed by the consignor in favour of Girdhari Lal, proprietor of Messrs. Bhalla Sales Corporation of Delhi, and enquiries by him from railway authorities at Delhi revealed that the Pakistan Customs authorities were demanding payment of some duty and at one stage the railway authorities informed Girdhari Lal as well as his predecessors -in -interest that it was not possible to have the goods brought to Delhi unless arrangements were made for the payment of the dues claimed by the Pakistan authorities. Correspondence, however, went on for a fairly long time. On the 17th December 1949 the railway authorities wrote to Girdhari Lal repudiating their liability, but a few days later they seem to have offered to go into the matter again and it was on the 6th March 1950 that the railway authorities finally declined to do anything further in the matter. On the 3rd March 1951, Girdhari Lal brought a suit against the Union of India through the Railway Administration for the recovery of Rs. 10,669/ - and costs and future interest in respect of the price of the goods not delivered to him.

(2.) SEVERAL pleas were raised in defence on behalf of the Union of India, but the main defence, with which we are now concerned, turned on the question of limitation. In the plaint Girdhari Lal had averred in paragraph 9 that "in ordinary course the goods should have been delivered to the Plaintiff at Delhi by the end of July 1947" and then went to say that "the said railway finally refused to deliver the goods by letter dated the 6th March, 1950" and then in paragraph 13 of the plaint it was said that "the suit is in time. The Plaintiff further submits that the earliest refusal to deliver the goods was by letter of Defendant No. 1, dated the 6th March, 1950, referred to above, i.e., within one year of the institution of the present suit". The Plaintiff's claims, therefore, that his suit was within time, rested firmly on the ground that, although in the ordinary course the goods should have been delivered to him by the end of July, 1947, the railway authorities did not finally decline to deliver the goods till the 6th March 1950 and time had begun to run only from that date, namely, 6th March 1950, which was the date of the letter terminating further correspondence.

(3.) FACED with situation, Mr. Bhagwat Dayal urges that he should not be tied down to the actual ground on which he had based his claim "that the suit was within time but should be allowed to go outside that claim, and his suggestion is that there are in the correspondence between the parties certain statements which should be taken was written acknowledgments of liability within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act. I do not, however, see how we can permit this at this stage when there is not even an application for any amendment of the plaint. It is obvious that had the Plaintiff -Respondent taken any such ground in the suit and alleged that any particular acknowledgment was made by the opposite party which had the effect of extending the period of limitation, it would have been open to the other party to show that the acknowledgment was either not made, or that it was not authorised, or that it was not within time, so that, if we were now to allow Mr. Bhagwat Dayal to raise this controversy, we would have to permit a re -opening of the pleadings and a retrial of the suit. There is in the present case no justification for adopting such an unusual course. On the pleadings as they stand, the position is clear and it is that on the Plaintiff's averments the present suit is barred by time. We must, in my opinion, so hold and therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the decree of the Court below, and instead dismiss the Plaintiff's suit but, considering all the circumstances, leave the parties to their own costs throughout.