SOHAN LAL Vs. TEJ RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The land in dispute is shown as shamilat patti Kulu hasab rasad qabza zamin and is situated in village Kiraka Tehsil Palwal, District Gurgaon. The excerpt Exhibit D.W. 1/1, produced on the record, shows that in 1918-1919, which is the earliest entry available on the record, Shibban is mentioned as a tenant-at-will. In 1922-23, a part of this land was with Shibban himself and the remaining was with one Jag Ram, who was his sub-tenant. From 1926-27 the entire land was entered as with Shibban as a tenant-at-will and other persons as sub-tenants. In the column of lagan the entry "besharah malkan" so far as Shibban was concerned, but so far as the sub-tenants were concerned they were paying half batai. For the first time in 1940-41 Fateh and Sohan Lal, sons of Birbal, are shown as "ghair maurusi doem" under Shibban and they were to pay half batai to Shibban. The suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, was filed by some of the co-sharers in shamilat patti claiming to be the owners and further alleging that Shibban was their tenant-at-will, that he had died without any legal heir and, therefore, they were entitled to get back the possession because sub-tenancies were created by Shibban without their consent or knowledge. The plea taken by the sub-tenants was that Shibban was, in fact, an occupancy tenant whose rights had matured into ownership on account of the vesting of proprietary rights in the occupancy tenants and that they were tenants under Shibban and the plaintiffs had no right to the land. Inter alia, they took up the position that other co-sharers of the patti were necessary parties. This plea was ultimately given up before the lower appellante Court. Both the Courts found that the plaintiffs were the owners of the land in suit and Shibban was not an occupancy tenant and had not acquired any right of ownership. With regard to the main question, it was held that the defendants were tenants, under Shibban but were not tenants of the landlord-plaintiffs and, therefore, they were trespassers after the demise of Shibban.

(2.) The only point urged in this second appeal filed on behalf of Fateh and Sohan Lal, the sub-tenants, is that the definition of "tenant", as given in the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, includes a sub-tenant, and under Section 9, no tenant can be ejected except on the grounds given therein, and one of the grounds, is 'if the tenant has sublet the land'. This point was not taken in the Courts below and there is no discussion on this point. Clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act entitles a landlord to seek ejectment of a tenant if he has sublet the tenancy or part thereof provided that if only a part of the tenancy is sublet, he shall be liable to be ejected only from such part. It is not, therefore, possible to understand what is the meaning of the definition. If a sub-tenant immediately on his entering on the land, by virtue of the definition of the word 'tenant'automatically becomes a tenant of the original landlord for all purposes, then one cannot understand why the original tenant should be ejected on his appointing such a sub-tenant. It is suggested on the other side that the definition really means that the sub-tenant, who is appointed as such with the consent of the landlord, would be entitled to all the privileges of a tenant under the Act. It is not possible to go into the question whether there was a consent or not given in the present case, for the obvious reason that no such plea was taken and such a matter was not put in issue. As at present advised, I feel that the definition of 'tenant' as given in the Act, does not mean that any sub-tenant, brought on the land by the tenant without the consent of the landlord or may be even against his wishes, would automatically be foisted on to the landlord and become his tenant. That 'sub-tenant' within the meaning of this definition means only a sub-tenant appointed with the landlord's consent.

(3.) For the reasons given above, I feel that there is not much force in the point raised for the first time in this Court and, therefore, reject this appeal. There will be no order as to costs.