HARNAM DASS Vs. SANT SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Sant Singh and three others brought an application under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act No. III of 1949), against Harnam Das petitioner for his ejectment inter alia on the grounds that he had not paid the rent and that he had sublet the premises to one Rakha Ram. Harnam Das took the plea that though he had executed a rent deed in favour of the landlords in Sambat 2005 Bk., yet later on he had surrendered possession to the landlords who had given the premises to one Rakha Ram who is actually in possession. This Rakha Ram was not made a party to the application under section 13. The learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that there was no subletting but held that Harnam Das had not paid the rent and in consequence he granted an order of ejectment. The learned Rent Controller further found that actual possession was with Rakha Ram. This order was confirmed in appeal.

(2.) The only point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner Harnam Das is that he is not in possession and he had not sublet the premises and that these being the findings of the Courts below they should not have granted an order of ejectment against him. It is, how- ever, not necessary to go into this question for the simple reason that the impugned order does not adversely affect the petitioner, because according to him he is not in possession. His only worry is that he may not be held liable for payment of the arrears of rent. The Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to deal with the question of the recovery of arrears of rent and for this, the landlords shall have to bring a separate suit in which the question whether he is liable or not shall have to be gone, and anything said in the present proceedings admittedly cannot operate as res judicata. The apprehensions of the petitioner are, therefore, ill- founded.

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that after the first date of hearing, when rent was not tendered by Harnam Das, the property had been transferred by Sant Singh, and others to one Narinder Kumar, who on his application was substituted to prosecute the proceedings. I see nothing wrong in this. After the first date of hearing, on non- payment of the arrears of rent, the landlord became entitled to get an ejectment order and by transfer of the property their right to get the tenant ejected was also passed to Narinder Kumar. The case would have been different if the application for ejectment had been based on personal requirement of the original landlords. In that case, the transfer of the property would not have passed the statutory rights to get ejectment on the ground of bonafide personal necessity, because the necessity of the transfers would be entirely different from that of the transferee. I find no force in this argument.