DAYAL SINGH Vs. SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This order will dispose of Civil Writ Nos. 830 of 1961 and 1258 of 1961. The question of law involved in both the petitions is the same, though the facts are different. I shall only for the sake of understanding the question of law state the facts in Civil Writ No. 830 of 1961.

(2.) The petitioner left immovable property in Pakistan as well as urban agricultural land. He got his claim for the immovable property verified and the verified claim was for Rs. 5,500/-. With regard to urban agricultural land, he did not get the claim verified. According to the Department, it was a case of honest error or misunderstanding of the press notes and other instructions issued by the government from time to time. With regard to the verified claim of the buildings, he was paid full compensation amounting to Rs. 2,705/- on the 15th November, 1957. Later on, the Government decided to give rehabilitation grants to persons who had not got their claims with regard to urban agricultural land verified. For that purpose applications were invited under rule 95 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. The petitioner filed his application and the value of his claim was assessed at Rs. 45,675/- for the purposes of the rehabilitation grant on the 22nd October, 1956. While determining the compensation to be paid on this amount the Department clubbed this claim with the claim for immovable property, i.e. the amount of Rs. 5,500/- was added to Rs. 45,675/- and on the basis of the total figure the net compensation payable was determined. Out of that, the amount already paid, i.e Rs. 2,705/- was deduced against property, by way of compensation and rehabilitation grant.

(3.) The petitioner dissatisfied with this order has come up to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. His contention is that while determining the rehabilitation grant in lieu of the urban agricultural land assessed at Rs. 45,675/- the claim with regard to the buildings could not be clubbed with it. In other words, he claims that the rehabilitation grant should be worked out on the value of the urban agricultural land alone as determined and not as has been done by the Department. Reliance is placed on Rule 18 and Rule 95 whereas the contention of the Department is that both the value of the urban agricultural land as well as of the buildings have to be clubbed together under rule 18 read with rule 98A and the total compensation or rehabilitation grant whichever it may be, has to be worked out on that basis. It is common ground that if the petitioner had got his claim with regard to agricultural land verified, the procedure adopted by the Department would be unexceptionable. In that eventuality the Department would be entitled even according to the petitioner to club together both the claims i.e. claim to the immovable property as well as the claim to the agricultural land, but the petitioner contends that what he is now being paid is not compensation but rehabilitation grant and rule 18 merely talks of claims and not rehabilitation grant, and, therefore, both being distinguishable they cannot be clubbed together under rule 18 because one is a claim and the other is rehabilitation grant. I am, however, unable to agree with this contention. The clubbing together was done after rule 98A had been brought on the statute book and rule 98-A is a deeming provision which would by its force bring rule 18 into play because a rehabilitation grant for purposes of rule 18 will have to be considered as a claim. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay V/s. Pandurang Vinayak Chapalkar, 1953 SCR 773 where their Lordships adopted the speech of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. V/s. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 which is as follows :-